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Advising the Individual Investor:
Comparing the Federal Regulation
of Investment Advisers, Banks, and
Broker-Dealers*
BY ALAN M. AHART**
INTRODUCTION
The individual investor may receive investment advice from a
variety of sources. Such advice may be furnished by persons who
are gainfully employed as accountants, lawyers, engineers, and
teachers, and by publishers of newspapers and magazines.' The
advice provided by such persons - and indeed by all persons or
organizations in the investment advisory business - generally
takes one of two forms. First, there is written advice distributed
* The author wishes to thank Professor Robert H. Mundheim, General Coun-
sel, Department of the Treasury, former Director, Center for Study of Financial In-
stitutions, University of Pennsylvania Law School, for his assistance in the
preparation of this article.
** Assistant Counsel, Bank of America National Trust and Savings Associa-
tion. Member, State Bar of California. The views expressed herein are solely the
author's.
1. See Legislative Proposals Concerning Regulation of Investment Advisers,
332 SEC. REG. & L REP. (BNA) E-1, E-7 (Dec. 17, 1975) [hereinafter cited as SEC
Proposals ].
to subscribers or customers. This advice may be furnished free or
for an annual subscription charge, and ordinarily involves dissem-
ination of newsletters on a periodic basis (e.g., monthly). The
newsletters evaluate the investment prospects of particular
stocks and bonds or industry groups. The reports are uniform in
nature; they make no attempt to relate recommendations to the
specific circumstances of the recipient-client. Second, there is ad-
vice, both written and oral, that is continuously rendered to cli-
ents in accordance with their particular needs and objectives.
This advice, of course, is much more personal, and may be discre-
tionary2 or nondiscretionary, depending upon whether the adviser
or the client makes the actual investment decisions. Whatever
the form of advice, the adviser and the client may enter into a
written contract which sets forth the duties the adviser owes to
such client and which specifies the compensation that the adviser
is to receive for performing these duties.
Banks, broker-dealers, 3 and "investment advisers" 4 also counsel
individual investors as to the merits of particular investments.
What distinguishes these advisers from those mentioned previ-
ously is the fact that banks, broker-dealers, and investment advis-
ers are engaged in the business of advising individual investors.5
2. Section 3(a)(35) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §
78(c)(a)(35) (1976) indicates that a person exercises "investment discretion"
when (1) he is authorized to determine what securities shall be purchased or sold,
or (2) he makes decisions as to what securities shall be bought or sold even
though some other person may have responsibility for such investment decisions.
3. A "broker-dealer" is any person engaged in the business of effecting trans-
actions in securities for his own account and for the account of others, but does
not include a bank. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a) (4), (5), 15 U.S.C. §
80b-2(a) (3),(5) (1976).
4. An "investment adviser" is one who, for compensation: (1) engages in the
business of advising others, either directly or through publications or writings, as
to the value of securities or as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or
selling securities; or, (2) as part of a regular business, issues or promulgates anal-
yses or reports concerning securities. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, §
202(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11) (1976). The Act specifically excludes from its
coverage "any broker or dealer whose performance [as an investment adviser] is
solely incidental to the conduct of his business as a broker or dealer and who re-
ceives no special compensation therefor." Id. § 202(a)(11)(C), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-
2(a)(11)(C) (1976) (Emphasis added). Since it is easy for one to assert that in-
vestment advisory services are incidental (or perhaps even necessary) to the bro-
kerage business, and since broker-dealers are paid for these services only
indirectly in the form of fixed commissions, this provision, in effect, enables bro-
ker-dealers to function as investment advisers as long as they also operate a bro-
kerage business. Banks are similarly excluded from this definition of "investment
adviser." Id. § 202(a)(11)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11) (A) (1976).
5. It might be argued that broker-dealers are not engaged in the business of
advising investors, but the author disagrees. Broker-dealers have been found to
publish an "impressive" volume and variety of investment publications. SEC Re-
port of Special Study of Securities Markets of the Securities and Exchange
Commission. H. R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 1 (1963) [hereinafter cited
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That is, they are either primarily engaged in investment advising
or advising is a necessary or important part of their primary busi-
ness.
Although banks, broker-dealers, and investment advisers per-
form a similar function, there are differences among them. For
example, unlike the others, the broker-dealer furnishes invest-
ment advice with the primary aim of selling securities. He may
not levy a separate fee for advice, and, if he has discretionary au-
thority over an account, he is not only in a position to decide what
security to buy or sell, but he is also in a position to execute the
relevant transaction.6 On the other hand, clients of banks and in-
vestment advisers who pay for advice can reasonably expect a
higher level of impartiality than can non-paying clients of broker-
dealers.7 If funds are placed in a bank-trustee account, the client
is probably more interested in stable, secure management than in
achieving maximum return on his investment. This may be espe-
cially true where the trust cannot be revoked. Moreover, when a
bank manages customer funds, unique conflicts of interest may
arise if the trust department is in any way linked to the bank's
commercial operation.8 Additionally, in the ordinary course of
business the bank and the broker-dealer-but not the investment
adviser-retain custody of clients' funds or securities.9 Neverthe-
less, because some advisers (notably the smaller organizations)
as Special Study]. The Special Study further noted that one broker-dealer had a
circulation of over 200,000 for its fortnightly investment magazine, while the largest
single investment adviser had a circulation of only 80,000. See id. 330-31. Broker-
dealers also advise investors on an individual basis (including discretionary man-
agement of personal portfolios).
Similarly, it seems clear that persons who issue financial publications, excepted
from the definition of "investment adviser" (see note 4 supra; Investment Advisers
Act of 1940, § 202 (a)(11)(D), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11)(D) (1976)), are also engaged
in the business of advising individuals on investments. However, because publish-
ers of such reports are exempted from registering as investment advisers, and be-
cause they are not specifically governed by any other federal laws, they will not be
discussed in this article.
6. See Special Study, supra note 5, at 369-70.
7. Id. at 359.
8. The most obvious example of this is when a bank has discretionary invest-
ment authority and thus, is placed in the delicate position of deciding whether to
place deposit funds with itself or invest them in municipal securities which it is
underwriting. Regulation 9 specifically permits the trust department of a national
bank to utilize the personnel and facilities of other departments of the bank to the
extent not prohibited by law. 12 C.F.R § 9-7(d) (1978). The problem is that con-
flicts of interest may occur in the absence of unlawful conduct.
9. See Special Study, supra note 5, at 369; SEC INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY
REPORT. H. R. Doc. No. 64, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 2, at 421 (1968).
do have custody, this article will proceed on the assumption that
investment advisers have custody of customer funds or securities
as well.
The purpose of this article is to compare the federal regulations
governing the conduct of banks, broker-dealers and investment
advisers rendering investment advice to individuals. Generally,
the object or effect of these regulations is to protect investors
from unfair, deceptive and manipulative practices. As a conse-
quence, they will be grouped for purposes of discussion into the
following categories: controls over competence, controls over in-
tegrity, and the mechanisms designed to insure compliance with
both. At the conclusion of the article, the regulations will be as-
sessed to determine the extent to which they protect individual
investors, and recommendations will be offered to correct per-
ceived deficiencies.
A COMPARISON OF FMUCIAY PROVISIONS
1. Investment Advisers
Regulating Competence
The only obstacle in the path of becoming an investment ad-
viser lies in the registration process under Section 203 of the Ad-
visers Act. Unless an adviser falls within one of the listed
exceptions,' 0 he must register with the SEC if he uses interstate
commerce to engage in the advisory business.1 Except where
the Commission finds that the applicant or any person associated
with him has committed any of several offenses, 12 and registration
10. The exceptions are as follows:
(1) any investment adviser all of whose clients are residents of the State
within which such investment adviser maintains his or its principal office
and place of business, and who does not furnish advice or issue analyses
or reports with respect to securities listed or admitted to unlisted trading
privileges on any national securities exchange;
(2) any investment adviser whose only clients are insurance companies;
or
(3) any investment adviser who during the course of the preceding
twelve months has had fewer than fifteen clients and who neither holds
himself out generally to the public as an investment adviser nor acts as an
investment adviser to any investment company registered under sub-
chapter I of this Act.
Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 203(b), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b) (1976).
11. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 203(a), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(a) (1976).
12. The "offenses" include: (1) wilful filing of an application for registration or
report which omits to state or is false or misleading regarding a material fact, (2)
conviction within 10 years of a felony or misdemeanor which bears upon personal
integrity or which arose out of conduct in a securities-related business, (3) being
subject to an injunction which prevents one from engaging in the securities busi-
ness, (4) wilful violation of or aiding or inducing someone else to violate any other
federal securities laws, (5) reasonable failure to supervise another person who vio-
lated such securities law, and (6) being subject to an order of the SEC barring or
[Vol. 6: 31, 1978] Advising the Individual Investor
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of such applicant would not be in the public interest, it will grant
registration.' 3
Regulating Integrity
Once registered, the adviser is subject to certain standards per-
taining to his dealings with clients. Specific standards apply to
the investment advisory contract entered into by adviser and cli-
ent. These standards nullify the effect of clauses which purport to
waive compliance with any provision of the Advisers Act, or any
rule, regulation or order thereunder;14 prohibit assignment of the
contract by the adviser without consent of the client;' 5 and obli-
gate the adviser, if the adviser is organized as a partnership, to
notify the client of any changes in the composition of the partner-
ship within a reasonable period of time.16
Restrictions are also placed on contractual provisions relating
to the adviser's compensation. The adviser may not receive fees
based upon the capital gains or capital appreciation of the client's
portfolio,17 but he may receive compensation based upon the total
value of a fund averaged over a definite period or determined as
of definite dates.18 This is usually expressed as a fixed percentage
of the value of assets under management, and reflects changes in
the amount of assets which the client entrusts to the adviser as
well as capital appreciation and depreciation of securities held in
the portfolio. 19 In the event that the total value of assets managed
by the adviser exceeds one million dollars, the contract may also
provide for compensation
based on the asset value of the . .. fund under management averaged
over a specified period and increasing and decreasing proportionately with
the investment performance of the ... fund over a specified period in re-
lation to the investment record of an appropriate index of securities
prices .... 20
This measure permits the wealthy client to pay an advisory fee
suspending one from being associated with an investment adviser. Id. § 203(e), 15
U.S.C. § 80b-3(e) (1976).
13. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 203(c) (2), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(c) (2) (1976).
14. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 215, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-15 (1976).
15. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 205(2), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5 (2) (1976).
16. Id. § 205(3), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5(3) (1976).
17. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 205(1), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5(1) (1976).
18. Id. § 205(3) (A), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5(3)(A) (1976).
19. See Mundheim, Some Thoughts on the Duties and Responsibilities of Unaf-
filiated Directors of Mutual Funds, 115 U. OF PA. L REv. 1058, 1065 (1967).
20. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 205(3)(B)(ii), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5(3)(B)
(ii) (1976).
which is not tied to infusions or withdrawals of capital, and in-
sures that the adviser's fee will be adjusted to reflect the differ-
ence, if any, between the fund's performance and the
performance of an appropriate index.
Other specific standards relate to particular functions per-
formed by investment advisers. The first proscribes use of the
term "investment counsel." The Advisers Act permits only those
persons or organizations whose principal business is investment
advising-a substantial part of which involves rendering continu-
ous particularized advice-to hold themselves out as "investment
counsel."21 Thus, it appears that an adviser issuing investment
newsletters could not identify himself as "investment counsel"
unless (1) he also acted as an investment counselor, and (2) this
activity constituted a "substantial" part of his business. However,
an investment adviser may call himself "investment counsel" pur-
suant to state law. 22 This is allowed because, under state law,
designation as investment counsel is intended to "establish a gen-
eral descriptive category for administrative purposes rather than
to distinguish between investment advisers who give general mar-
ket advice and those who give individualized service."23 Unfortu-
nately, some clients may not be aware of this distinction. They
may very well regard all "investment counsel" in the same man-
ner. As a result, the federal restrictions placed upon use of this
term may not produce the desired effect.
A second such provision deals with the situation where the ad-
viser acts as a broker-dealer for his clients. If he knowingly (1)
buys a security from or sells a security to a client while acting as
principal for his own account, or (2) effects a purchase or sale of
any security for the account of a client, while acting as a broker
for someone other than the client, then he must satisfy the two
conditions of the provision.24
Other sections of the Advisers Act-206, 207, and 208-pertain to
various forms of fraud or deceit. Section 206 states that it shall be
21. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 208(c), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-8(c) (1976).
22. See SEC Investment Advisers Act Release No. IA-8 (Dec. 12, 1940).
23. Id.
24. See Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 206(3), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(3) (1976).
Before the transaction is completed, he must provide the client with a written
statement which discloses the capacity in which he is acting, and the client must
consent to the transaction. Id. The written disclosure and the consent (which may
be either oral or written) must be obtained prior to completion of each separate
transaction; a blanket disclosure and consent in a general agreement between the
client and the advisor is inadequate. SEC Investment Advisers Act Release No.
IA-40 (Jan. 5, 1945). Antifraud provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934 require disclosures in addition to the capacity in
which the adviser acts. See SEC Investment Advisers Act Release No. IA-40 (Jan.
5, 1945).
36
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unlawful for any adviser (including those who are exempt from
registration) who utilizes interstate commerce:
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud any client or pro-
spective client;
(2) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which
operates as a fraud or deceit upon any client or prospective client;
(4) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which is fraudu-
lent, deceptive, or manipulative. 25
Under paragraph (4), the section also provides that the Commis-
sion shall define the meaning of "fraudulent, deceptive, or manip-
ulative" business practices and shall prescribe means reasonably
designed to prevent such practices.26 Pursuant to this authoriza-
tion, the Commission has issued Rule 206(4)-127 which pertains,
generally, to advertisements circulated by investment advisers.
Sections 207 and 208, unlike Section 206, deal with specific situa-
tions. Section 207 prohibits any person (again, nonregistered ad-
25. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 206, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1976).
26. Id.
27. 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-i (1977). This rule prohibits distribution of any ad-
vertisement which (1) refers to a testimonial that praises the adviser; (2) refers to
past specific recommendations of the adviser that were profitable; (3) represents
that any graph, chart, formula or other device will assist any person in making his
own investment decisions or, by itself, can be employed to make such decisions,
without disclosing prominently the difficulties associated with such use; (4) con-
tains a statement that any analysis or other report is free unless such item actu-
ally will be provided without obligation; or (5) is false, misleading, or includes any
untrue statement of a material fact.
The advertisement may, however, state past recommendations or offer to fur-
nish a list of such recommendations if:
(1) the past recommendations span at least one full year immediately
prior to the date of the advertisement;
(2) the name of each recommended security is given, along with the date
and nature of each such recommendation (e.g., whether to buy, sell, or
hold), the market price at that time, the price at which the recommenda-
tion was to be acted upon, and the market price of each such security as
of the most recent practicable date;
(3) a cautionary legend is printed in type as large as the largest type
used in the text which says "it should not be assumed that recommenda-
tions made in the future will be profitable or will equal the performance of
the securities in this list."
Id. A proposed amendment to this rule would have clarified that the advertise-
ment must include all of the prior recommendations or an offer to supply a list of
all such recommendations; it would not have permitted the inclusion of some rec-
ommendations and an invitation to furnish a list of the remaining recommenda-
tions. Also, it would have required that the advertisement be approved in writing
by a supervisor designated to oversee such advertisements. Proposed amendment
to Rule 206(4)-l, [1967-1969 Transfer Binderl FED. SEC. L REP. (CCH) 77,612.
The amendment, however, was rescinded by the SEC. See Wall Street Journal,
Feb. 27, 1976, at 32, col. 4.
visers are included) from wilfully making an untrue statement of
a material fact in any registration application (Section 203) or re-
port (Section 204) filed with the Commission, or from wilfully
omitting to state in any such application or report any material
fact which is required to be stated therein.28 Section 208 prohibits
a registered adviser from representing that its qualifications or
abilities have been passed upon by the United States or any
agency or officer thereof, although it may indicate, simply, that it
is an investment adviser registered under the Investment Advis-
ers Act of 1940.29
Enforcement Mechanisms
An essential component of an effective enforcement scheme is
the ability to both discourage and discover violations. The Advis-
ers Act accomplishes these objectives through its provisions relat-
ing to recordkeeping and custody of client funds and securities.
Such provisions not only deter violations-to the extent that dis-
closure and possible prosecution discourage illicit conduct-but
also protect the financial interest of customers.
Section 204 of the Act provides that investment advisers shall
make, keep, disseminate, and furnish copies of records as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.30 It also provides
that such records are subject to inspection by representatives of
the SEC at any time.31 Pursuant to Rule 204-2,32 an adviser must
preserve various records, including all written agreements (or
copies thereof), between him and his customers. 33 If a newsletter
sent to clients does not state the reasons for recommendations
contained therein, the adviser must draft and keep a separate
memorandum stating the reasons for the recommendations.
3 4
The Rule also requires investment advisers who render particu-
larized advice to maintain certain records, primarily dealing with
securities transactions, concerning customers' accounts.
35 All
28. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 207, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-7 (1976).
29. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 208, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-8 (1976). Compare
this provision with the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 26, 15 U.S.C. § 78z (1976).
Assuming that subscribers of newsletters published by investment advisers are
prospective purchasers or sellers of securities, section 26, inter alia, prohibits an
adviser from representing to its subscribers that action or failure to act by the
SEC regarding reports filed with the agency indicates that such reports are true
and accurate or not false or misleading. Id.
30. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 207, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-7 (1976).
31. Id.
32. 17 C.F.R. § 275.204-2 (1977).
33. Id. § 275.204-2(a) (10).
34. Id. § 275.204-2(a)(11).
35. For example, investment advisers who have discretionary investment au-
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records required to be kept by Rule 204-2 must be maintained and
preserved in an easily accessible location for at least five years
and during the first two of these years they must be held in an
office of the adviser.3 6 Advisers who have custody of client funds
or securities must also comply with the terms of Rule 206-4.37
thority over customer accounts must keep a list of all such accounts, must keep
copies of evidences granting such authority (including powers of attorney), id §
275.204-2(a) (8), (9) and are required to divulge their practices regarding commis-
sions paid to effect transactions for such accounts. See Securities Exchange Act of
1934, § 28(e)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(e)(2) (1976), added by section 21(2) of the Securi-
ties Acts Amendments of 1975. This section applies to all persons who manage se-
curities on a discretionary basis, and gives "the appropriate regulatory agency"
the authority to require disclosure of practices relating to commissions. For in-
vestment advisers and broker-dealers, the appropriate agency is, of course, the
SEC. The appropriate agency for national bank trust departments is the Comp-
troller of the Currency and the Federal Reserve Board is the appropriate agency
for investment advisory or trust subsidiaries of bank holding companies. Addi-
tionally, if investment advisers have discretionary authority over at least $100 mil-
lion in equity securities, they are required to make periodic reports to the SEC
regarding such disclosures. Section 13(f) of the Securities Exchange Act, which
was added by section 10 of the Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, empowers the
SEC to require disclosure of the equity security holdings of institutional money
managers who have discretionary investment authority over a specified amount of
such funds. The amount specified is $100 million, but could be as low as $10 mil-
lion. Detailed reports may be required as often as once each quarter but not less
frequently than once each year. See id. This section was implemented by requir-
ing yearly reports only for those institutions with holdings of $100 million or more.
Securities Exchange Act Rel. No. 34-14852, 3 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 26,854A
(June 15, 1978). All investment advisers must maintain a record of every transac-
tion in a security in which they acquire direct or indirect beneficial ownership. 17
C.F.R. § 275.204-2(a) (12), (13) (1977). For each individual client they are obligated
to keep records of the date, amount, and price of securities bought and sold, and
must be prepared to furnish the names of clients and the current security holdings
of such clients. Id. § 275.204-2(c). However, except where disclosure is necessary
or appropriate in an enforcement proceeding or investigation, the Commission has
no authority to require disclosure of the identity, investments, or affairs of clients
of an investment adviser. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 210(c), 15 U.S.C. §
80b-10(c) (1976). Rule 204-2 also provides that the identity of an investment ad-
viser's clients may be indicated by a numerical, alphabetical or similar code on the
books and records kept by the adviser. 17 C.F.R. § 275.204-2(d) (1977).
36. 17 C.F.R. § 275.204-a(e)(1)(1977). If the adviser ceases to do business
before the expiration of five years he must notify the Commission of the exact ad-
dress where the records will be maintained until the period elapses. 17 C.F.R. §
275.204-2(f) (1977). Partnership articles, articles of incorporation, and any amend-
ments thereto, also must be maintained by the adviser in its principal office, and
preserved for at least three years after he ceases to do business. Id. § 275.204-
2(e) (2).
37. Client securities generally must be segregated, identified as to which client
has the beneficial interest therein, and held in a safe place. Id. § 275.206(4)-2(a) (1)
(1977). Client funds must be deposited in bank accounts containing only customer
funds, in the name of the adviser as agent or trustee. Id. § 275.206(4)-2(a) (2) (i)
(ii). Immediately after the adviser takes custody of such funds or securities from
Responsibility for enforcing the Advisers Act is lodged prima-
rily with the SEC. The Commission may censure an investment
adviser, place limitations on his activities, or suspend or revoke
his registration or the registration of any person associated (or
seeking to become associated) with the investment adviser. This
can be done if the SEC finds that (1) such action is in the public
interest, and (2) the adviser or any person associated with him
has committed any of several offenses. 38 The Commission has the
power to grant exemptions from provisions of the Act, or the rules
or regulations thereunder, in appropriate circumstances. 39 The
Commission may investigate alleged violations, subpoena wit-
nesses, and take evidence. 40 It may also invoke the aid of a court
(and the court's contempt power) to compel the testimony of wit-
nesses and the production of books and records.41 Any person ca-
pable of testifying or furnishing records who, without just cause,
fails to do so, is guilty of a misdemeanor and is subject to a fine of
up to $1,000, or imprisonment for up to one year, or both.42
The SEC may hold public hearings.43 It may also issue, amend
and rescind rules, regulations and orders pursuant to powers con-
ferred upon it by the Act." In addition, the SEC may bring suit
any client it is incumbent on him to give written notice to the client stating the
place and manner in which such funds or securities will be kept, and if there is
any change subsequent thereto, every client affected must receive written notice
of such change. Id. § 275.206(4)-2(i) (3). At least once every quarter the adviser is
obligated to send an itemized statement to each client indicating the funds or se-
curities in his possession and all debits, credits and transactions in such client's
account which occurred during the quarter. Id. § 275.206(4)-2(a)(4). Finally, all
such funds and securities must be verified annually through an actual examina-
tion by an independent public accountant without prior notice to the adviser. Id. §
275.206(4)-2(a) (5). The accountant then files a certificate with the SEC stating the
results of the examination. Id.
Various records must also be maintained. A separate record must be kept of
each bank account in which client funds are deposited in the name of the adviser
as agent or trustee. Id. § 275.206(4)-2(a)(2)(iii). The record must contain the
name and address of the bank, the dates and amounts of any deposits or with-
drawals from the account, and the precise amount of each client's beneficial inter-
est in the account. Id. Other records that must be maintained include: (1) a
journal showing all debits, credits, purchases, sales, receipts and delivery of secur-
ities for each account, Id. § 275.204-2(b) (1): (2) a separate ledger which largely
duplicates this information (the ledger must show the date and price of each
purchase and sale of securities); (3) copies of confirmations of all transactions ef-
fected for the account; and (4) a record for each security which shows the client's
name, the interest of such client, and the location of the security (or an acceptable
identifying code). 17 C.F.R. § 275.204-2(b), (d) (1977).
38. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 203(e), (f), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(e), (f)
(1976).
39. Id. § 206A, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(a)(1976).
40. Id. § 209(b), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-9(b) (1976).
41. Id. § 209(c), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-9(c) (1976).
42. Id.
43. Id. § 212, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-12 (1976).
44. Id. § 211(a), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-11(a) (1976).
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to enjoin those who have violated or will violate or those who
have aided in the violation of any provisions of the Act or of any
rule, regulation, or order thereunder.45 Upon proper showing, a
permanent or temporary injunction will be granted without
bond.46 Criminal prosecutions are left to the discretion of the At-
torney General.47 Persons who are convicted of wilfully violating
the Act, or any rule, regulation, or order issued by the Commis-
sion pursuant thereto, may be fined up to $10,000, imprisoned for
up to five years, or both.48
Although the Advisers Act does not explicitly provide for main-
tenance of a suit by a private plaintiff, some courts have found an
implicit private right of action for damages under the Act.49 Other
courts, however, have held that no such right of action can be im-
plied.5 0 In reaching its holding that no private right of action is
sanctioned by the Act, one court relied on the fact that, unlike
comparable sections of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Sec-
tion 27) and the Investment Company Act of 1940 (Section 44),
the jurisdictional section of the Advisers Act (Section 214) does
not contain the language "actions at law."5 ' As a result of the dif-
fering judicial interpretations, the SEC proposed to Congress that
such language be added to Section 214 to clarify the existence of a
45. Id. § 209(e), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-9(e) (1976).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. § 217, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-17 (1976). The criminal sanction has been em-
ployed infrequently. Between 1940 and 1964 there were only two criminal
convictions under the Investment Advisers Act. See Comment, The Regulation of
Investment Advice: Subsciption Advisers and Fiduciary Duties, 63 MICH. L. REV.
1220, 1224 n.27 (1965) (hereinafter cited as Michigan Comment].
49. Angelakis v. Churchill Mg't Corp., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 95, 285 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Bolger v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Howarth &
Howarth, 381 F. Supp. 260 (S.D. N.Y. 1974). See generally, Note, Private Causes of
Action Under Section 206 of the Investment Advisers Act. 74 MICH. L. REV. 308-48
(1975).
50. Gammage v. Robert, Scott & Co., [1974-1975 Transfer Binderi FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 94, 761 (S.D. Cal. 1974); Greenspan v. Eugene Campos Del Toro,
Civil No. 73-638 (S.D. Fla., May 17, 1974).
51. See SEC Proposals, supra note 1. The relevant language of section 214
reads as follows:
The district courts of the United States and the United States courts of
any Territory or other place subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States shall have jurisdiction of violations of this title or the rules, regula-
tions, or orders thereunder, and, concurrently with State and Territorial
courts, of all suits in equity to enjoin any violation of this title or the rules,
regulations, or orders thereunder.
Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 213, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-14 (1976) (emphasis added).
private right of action under the Act.52
2. Broker-dealers Contrasted with Investment Advisers
The Investment Advisers Act exempts from registration those
broker-dealers who provide investment advice solely incidental to
their business and for which they receive no special compensa-
tion.53 In the case of newsletters distributed to potential clients,
it is unlikely that any charge would be levied in connection with
the solicitation of business. Precisely because such reports are
circulated in an attempt to attract clients, a strong argument can
be made that this service is "solely incidental" to the business of
executing securities transactions so that the exemption would ap-
ply.
Similarly, when the broker-dealer merely provides uniform in-
vestment reports to existing clients, the same exemption is appli-
cable. As long as these clients use the broker-dealer to effect
their securities transactions, it seems that the advisory service is
"solely incidental" to the brokerage business. Unless the broker-
dealer imposes a fee for the service directly,54 or indirectly (by
surcharging the transaction costs for those receiving the newslet-
ters), there will be no "special compensation" for the service.
Thus, broker-dealers who advise customers or potential custom-
ers through a uniform publication are not usually obliged to regis-
ter as Investment Advisers.
On the other hand, broker-dealers who furnish investment ad-
vice to clients in accordance with their individual needs may very
well have to register as investment advisers. This is due to the
fact that broker-dealers may no longer be able to assert that they
receive "no special compensation" for providing this service be-
cause commission rates are no longer "fixed.155 If such broker-
52. See SEC Proposals, supra note 1.
53. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 202(a)(11)(c), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11)
(c) (1976).
54. A few investment advisers also act as broker-dealers. If such an organiza-
tion is characterized as a broker-dealer, then it must register as an investment ad-
viser. However, to a limited extent, the Advisers Act recognizes that investment
advisers who are already registered as broker-dealers ought not be subject to reg-
ulatory provisions that substantially duplicate each other. See, e.g., Rules 204-
2(h)(1) and 206(3)-1, 17 C.F.R. §§ 275.204(2)(h)(1), 275.206(3)-1 (1977).
55. The essential disctinction here is "between compensation for advice itself
and compensation for services of another character to which the advice is merely
incidental." SEC Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2 (Oct. 28, 1940). One au-
thor has stated that broker-dealers who continue to charge uniform commissions
will continue to be exempted from the Advisers Act if investment advisory serv-
ices are solely incidental to the conduct of their business and if no "special com-
pensation" is received in connection therewith. Lovitch, The Investment Advisers
Act of 1940 - Who is an Investment Adviser? 24 KAN. L. REv. 67, 102 (1975). How-
ever, an argument can be made that, because some broker-dealers do not have
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dealers are required to register as investment advisers, they are
equally subject to the fiduciary provisions described herein.
In any event, broker-dealers must register under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.56 While registration as a broker-dealer is
not directly designed to regulate the investment advising func-
tion, many provisions of the Exchange Act do, in effect, govern
this activity. As a result, consideration will be given to all sec-
tions of the Exchange Act (including the rules and regulations
thereunder) which apply to the brokerage business, but which
are not specifically intended to control other functions of broker-
dealers (i.e., execution of transactions, market making, and par-
ticipation in an underwriting).
The rules of self-regulatory organizations also prescribe the
conduct of broker-dealers who advise clients on investment deci-
sions. Those who are members of the National Association of Se-
curities Dealers (NASD broker-dealers) must comply with the
rules of that body, while nonmembers are subject to a set of simi-
lar rules promulgated by the SEC (SECO broker-dealers). Al-
though individual differences will be noted, this article will not
attempt to distinguish between the two because their rules
closely parallel one another.
Broker-dealers who are members of the securities exchanges
are, of course, also governed by their rules. However, only appli-
cable rules of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the largest
and most important of the exchanges, will be dealt with here.
Many broker-dealers who are members of one or more exchanges
belong to the NYSE, and relevant regulations of the other ex-
changes are likely to duplicate those of the NYSE.57 Discussion
of the pertinent NYSE rules will be confined to footnotes since
these rules, in turn, often duplicate NASD or SECO provisions.
fixed commission rates, the difference (if any) between the market-determined
commission for execution only and the commission paid by the advisory client
amounts to compensation paid for the advice itself where the spread cannot be at-
tributed entirely to other services rendered by the broker-dealer. See SEC Invest-
ment Advisers Act Release No. 2 (Oct. 28, 1940) which intimates that if any
relation can be found between the advice rendered and the amount of commission
charged, the broker-dealer will be required to register as an Investment Adviser.
56. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 15(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(a)(1) (1976).
See also text accompanying notes 58-60 infra.
57. See Special Study, .supra note 5, at 375.
Regulating Competence
Like investment advisers, broker-dealers must register with the
SEC.58 The only exception to this rule is that broker-dealers
whose business is exclusively intrastate 59 and broker-dealers
whose business is to effect transactions in "exempted securities,"
commercial paper, bankers' acceptances or commercial bills are
not required to register.6O The Advisers Act also exempts from re-
gistration any person whose advice relates only to "exempted se-
curities," though the definition of "exempted securities" is
somewhat more limited under that Act.6 1 However, unlike the Se-
curities Exchange Act, the Advisers Act not only exempts intra-
state advisers (and other advisers that it could reach under the
Constitution) but also exempts two classes of advisers who serve
specified clients.62 Interestingly, the SEC has recognized the dis-
crepancy between the jurisdictional reach of the two statutes and
has proposed that the jurisdictional breadth of the Advisers Act
also be extended to all intrastate advisers whose activities affect
interstate commerce.63 No mention was made, though, of the cli-
ent-geared exemptions-one excepting advisers whose only cli-
58. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 15(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(a)(1)(1976).
59. See id. This exemption has a much narrower scope than the intrastate ex-
emption found in the Advisers Act. Compare id. with notes 62-64 and accompany-
ing text infra. Elimination of the Advisers Act exemption would bring that Act
into conformity with the Securities Exchange Act, since there is probably no con-
stitutional authority for federal regulation of activities which are wholly of an in-
trastate character.
60. Id.
61. The Investment Advisers Act exempts from registration those advisers
whose advice relates only to securities which are (1) obligations of the United
States and (2) securities issued or guaranteed by corporations in which the United
States has an interest which have been designated as exempted securities by the
Secretary of the Treasury, pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act. Investment
Advisers Act of 1940, § 202(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11) (1976). The Securities
Exchange Act not only defines these securities as exempt, but also exempts the
following: (1) any interest in a common trust fund maintained by a bank exclu-
sively for the collective investment and reinvestment of assets contributed thereto
by such bank acting in a fiduciary capacity; (2) any interest in a collective trust
fund maintained by a bank or in a separate account maintained by an insurance
company which interest is issued in connection with (A) a qualified stock bonus,
pension, or profit-sharing plan or (B) an annuity plan that meets the requirement
for deduction of the employer's contribution contained in section 404(a) (2) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, other than any plan described in clause (a) or (b)
which covers employees some or all of whom are employees within the meaning of
section 401(c) (1) of such Code; and (3) such other securities which the Commis-
sion may exempt. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 3(a) (12), 15 U.S.C. §
78c(a)(12) (1976).
62. See text accompanying note 64 infra.
63. See SEC Proposals, supra note 1, at E-6. The definition of "interstate com-
merce" would be amended to include intrastate use of any facility of a national
securities exchange or of a telephone or other interstate means of communication
or of any other interstate instrumentality. Id.
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ents are insurance companies, the other excepting advisers who
have fewer than fifteen clients annually and who neither hold
themselves out to the public as investment advisers nor act as in-
vestment advisers to registered investment companies.64
Another facet of control over competence is the registration
process for broker-dealers, which is virtually identical to that for
investment advisers.65 However, in marked contrast to invest-
ment advisers, broker-dealers must meet certain standards of
training, qualifications, 66 and financial responsibility. 67 Pursuant
64. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 203(b) (2), (3), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-
3(b)(2),(3) (1976).
65. This process is described in the text accompanying notes 10-12 supra.
The NYSE may deny membership to a registered broker-dealer if the broker-
dealer does not meet the requisite standards of financial or operations capability,
or if such broker-dealer or any associated person thereof fails to satisfy such
standards of training, experience, and competence as are prescribed in the rules of
the NYSE. Membership may also be denied if a broker-dealer or associated per-
son thereof has engaged, and there is a reasonable likelihood that he may again
engage, in acts or practices inconsistent with just and equitable principles of
trade. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 6(c) (3) (A), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(c) (3) (A)
(1976).
Principal executive officers must be designated by the directors as having senior
principal executive responsibility for various aspects of the corporation's business.
In addition, directors and officers of such corporation must be approved in writing
by the Exchange. 2 N.Y.S.E. GUIDE (CCH) 2320. See also id. 2345.
Employees of NYSE broker-dealers are subject to relatively few restrictions.
They should be thoroughly investigated before being employed; if possible the
member should have personal conversations with all those who employed the pro-
spective employee during the previous three years. Id. 2345.18. The investiga-
tion and verification of a prospective employee's background must be conducted
by a partner, voting stockholder, or by any authorized person under his supervi-
sion. Id. A record of his employment application must be kept on file for three
years after he terminates his employment with the broker-dealer. Id. Compliance
with this rule is deemed to satisfy the recordkeeping requirements of Rule 17a-3,
as far as employee records are concerned. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-3(a) (12) (i) (i)
(1977). The Exchange reserves the right to disapprove the employment of any
person, and ordinarily will not permit an employee to work at a second job. 2
N.Y.S.E. GUIDE (CCH) 2345, 2350.10. Approval will be granted if the employ-
ment is of a routine or clerical nature. Id. Without approval of the Exchange, em-
ployees cannot be connected by employment or otherwise to any other financial or
securities-related business. Id. 2346. Part-time clerical work which does not con-
flict with normal duties or with normal hours of employment would be permitted.
Id.
A member (and allied member) of the NYSE must pass an examination on the
securities business given by the Exchange within nine months of becoming such
member. If he exceeds this limit or if he fails to pass the examination in three
attempts, he will lose his membership. 2 N.Y.S.E. GUIDE (CCH) 2304.
66. In order to qualify for registration, a prospective broker-dealer must also
meet a negative requirement: no expulsion or present suspension from the NASD
or a national securities exchange on his part or on the part of any associated per-
to the Securities Acts Amendments of 197568-which amended
sons for violation of any such exchange or NASD rule which prohibits "any act or
transaction constituting conduct inconsistent with just and equitable principles of
trade or required any act the omission of which constitutes conduct inconsistent
with just and equitable principles of trade." 17 C.F.R. § 240.15b82(a) (1977). Addi-
tionally, in order to qualify, broker-dealer and persons associated with him may
not be barred or suspended from being associated with the members of the NASD
or any such exchange because of this conduct. Id.
The Commission has not specified which rules of the NYSE and the NASD pro-
hibit "conduct inconsistent with just and equitable principles of trade." However,
since the general business standards applicable to NASD broker-dealers, SECO
broker-dealers and NYSE broker-dealers contain the same or similar language, at
a minimum it should refer to violations of these rules. See text preceding note 86
infra; see 2 N.Y.S.E. GUIDE (CCH) 2401. With regard to the NYSE rules, it may
include conduct which does not violate any specific rule but which is labeled as
inconsistent with just and equitable principles of trade. See id. 1656. Interest-
ingly, the Exchange has also declared that wilful violation of any provisions of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or any rule or regulation thereunder is conduct
inconsistent with just and equitable principles of trade. See id. 1657. Thus, the
SEC could disqualify a broker-dealer's registration on the premise that he had vio-
lated a rule of the NYSE, when in fact he had violated the Exchange Act.
The NYSE has elected to implement training and qualifications standards for
two classes of employees: "registered representatives" and "supervisory analysts".
The NYSE rules define a registered representative as an employee engaged either
in the solicitation of orders for securities for the accounts of customers of his em-
ployer or in the solicitation of subscriptions to an investment advisory or invest-
ment management service provided by his employer on a fee basis. Id. 2010.
Therefore, if the broker-dealer distributes newsletters to potential clients for a fee,
all those employees engaged in soliciting subscriptions to the service are "regis-
tered representatives". But many broker-dealers circulate such reports without
levying any charge. See text preceding note 6 supra. Employees who work exclu-
sively on the preparation and dissemination of such letters would not be consid-
ered registered representatives. Of course, if such employees are also involved in
the solicitation of orders, they would satisfy the definition. Moreover, even though
an employee may merely execute trades for some customers who regularly re-
ceive free copies of the firm's newsletter, he too may be regarded as a registered
representative because he solicits orders from other clients. The net result is that
employees of the broker-dealer who are involved in performing a service that is
comparable to a subscription publication-as well as employees of a broker-dealer
who competes with investment counsellors-more than likely fall within the defi-
nition of "registered representatives", even though they may not be actually re-
quired to register as such.
This is not an insignificant point, since registered representatives must possess
certain qualifications before they can occupy positions in the securities business.
Whereas a registered representative has suffered investigations by both the Ex-
change and the employer in order to determine whether there is adequate evi-
dence of his integrity and a record of "high standards of business conduct," non-
registered representatives have not been subjected to such scrutiny. 2 N.Y.S.E.
Guide (CCH) 1 2345.18. Note that if the prospective employee already is a mem-
ber of the Exchange, he will not be required to qualify as a registered representa-
tive. Id. 2345.12. However, if a member or allied member lacks experience and
intends to service customer accounts in the office of a member organization, he
may be required to undergo a period of training and pass the examination for reg-
istered representatives. Id. 2304.70. Registered representatives cannot be
younger than 21 years of age. Id. 2345.15, See also 1402, and must agree to a
series of conditions before they commence employment. See id. 2345.10-16. One
of these conditions is that the registered representative will not share in the prof-
its or losses of any customer's account. Id. 2345.16. If they have not had previous
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Section 15(b) (8) of the Securities Exchange Act and redesignated
it Section 15(b) (7)-the Commission altered Rule 15b8-1 to re-
quire all employees engaged in research or investment advice for
broker-dealers who are not members of the NASD to pass a gen-
eral securities examination.69 A comparable requirement exists
for employees of members of the NASD.70 However, it has been
experience in the securities or a related industry, they must undergo four months
of training. Id. 2345.15. Unless waived, they also must pass an examination at
the end of their training. Id. Additionally, registered representatives shall be full-
time employees and, unless permitted by the Board of Directors of the exchange,
cannot be financially interested in any other organization involved in the securi-
ties or a similar business. Id. 2346. Except for the examination required of bro-
ker-dealers, no comparable limitations are placed on the employees of either
investment advisers or broker-dealers who are not members of the NYSE. This is
true whether or not the broker-dealer is a member of the NASD. It is even doubt-
ful that the NASD or SECO examinations are as comprehensive as the examina-
tions given to registered representatives by the NYSE. However, the SEC has
been given authority to standardize these tests. See text accompanying note 72
supra.
"Supervisory analysts" are responsible for approving correspondence of a bro-
ker-dealer before it is sent out, including so-called "research reports". The ana-
lysts must, in turn, be approved by the Exchange, are subject to Exchange
investigation of their background, must present evidence of appropriate experi-
ence, and must pass an Exchange Supervisory Analysists Examination. 2 N.Y.S.E.
GuIDE (CCH) 2344. If he has earned designation as a Chartered Financial Ana-
lyst he need pass only that portion of the examination which deals with Exchange
rules on research standards and related matters. Id.
67. As part of the registration process a broker-dealer must file a detailed
statement of financial condition. This statement must disclose the assets and lia-
bilities of the broker-dealer, must contain a computation of his aggregate indebt-
edness and net capital in compliance with Rule 15c3-1 under the Exchange Act,
and must describe how he will operate his business (including facilities, person-
nel, supervisory procedures, books and records, and financing arrangements for
the first year). 17 C.F.R. § 240.15bl-2 (1977). This rule was promulgated before the
Securities Acts Amendments of 1975 were enacted.
A person who applies for membership in the NYSE must post a $7,500 initiation
fee and must be approved by a 2/3 vote of the Board of Directors of the Exchange.
2 N.Y.S.E. GUIDE (CCH) 7 1403, 1404.
68. Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, § 11(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b) (7) (1976).
69. Formerly, examinations were not required of employees of SECO broker-
dealers who effected transactions solely on national securities exchanges.
70. NASD MANAL (CCH) 1102A. The NASD distinguishes between two
classes of employees with regard to examination requirements: principals and reg-
istered representatives. Persons who are actively engaged in the management of a
member broker-dealer must register as principals, and must pass Part I of the
Qualification Examination for Principals. Id. 1102A, at 1047, 1053. Unless waived
by the President of the NASD, a member firm of the NASD must have at least two
partners or officers registered as principals. Id. T 1102A, at 1048. One principal of-
ficer or partner must be designated "financial principal", and must pass both parts
of the two part Qualification Examination for Principals. Id. 1102A, at 1047-48.
His duties include, but are not necessarily limited to, the actual preparation
revealed that these examinations are not standardized and, per-
haps more importantly, that they fail to test on certain subjects
vital to the management of a brokerage business. 7 1 As a conse-
quence, the underlying purpose of new Section 15(b) (7), as
amended by the Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, is to give
the Commission authority to establish uniform examinations for
all broker-dealers and their associated persons, and to require
that partners, officers, and supervisory employees (or specified
classes thereof) be examined on, inter alia, the following topics:
bookkeeping, accounting, internal control over cash and securi-
ties, supervision of employees, and maintenance of records.
72
Again, the SEC has recognized the disparity between rules
dealing with investment advisers and those dealing with broker-
dealers. In response, it has not only proposed Rule 206(4)-4 which
would require written disclosure of an adviser's qualifications,
7 3
but, in addition, has asked Congress for the authority to prescribe
training and qualification standards for investment advisers.74 In
support of the latter proposal, the Commission argues that (1)
"clients of investment advisers rely as heavily on the competence
of their investment advisers as do clients of broker-dealers" and
(2) state regulation in this area is inadequate. 75 The Commis-
sion's proposal, styled after Section 15(b) (7) of the Exchange
Act,76 would provide the Commission with flexibility to create dif-
ferent qualification standards for different types of investment ad-
visers, and for different categories of personnel employed by
and/or approval of financial statements along with net capital calculations and
supporting schedules. Id.
Employees of a member, other than principals, who are engaged in the supervi-
sion, solicitation, or conduct of business in securities (or who train employees to
perform these functions) are called registered representatives. Id. 1102A, at
1048-49. They must register, and pass a less rigorous examination. See id. 1102A,
at 1048, 1052-53. Employees who previously passed an examination pursuant to
section 15(b)(7) of the Exchange Act, as amended, and Rule 15b8-1 thereunder
(SECO Examination) or a state securities examination accepted by the SEC are
not required to pass the Qualification Examination for Registered Representa-
tives, but must pass a test based upon the rules of the NASD. Id. 1102A, at 1049.
Whether a prospective principal or registered representative, each member is
under an affirmative duty to investigate the character, reputation, qualifications
and experience of such persons before certifying such in the application for regis-
tration with the NASD. Id. 2177.
71. H. R. REP. No. 94-229, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 105 (1975).
72. Id.
73. Rule 206(4)-4 was proposed in Investment Advisers Act Release No. IA-442
(March 5, 1975), [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 80, 128.
The proposed rule would require investment advisers to furnish prospective cli-
ents with a written disclosure statement before they enter into, extend or renew
an investment advisory contract with the adviser. Id.
74. See SEC Proposals, supra note 1, at E-3 to E-6.
75. Id. E-4.
76. See id. E-1, E-3 to E-4
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them.7 7 In addition, the Commission has requested that it be
given explicit authority to establish minimum age requirements
for investment advisers and their associated persons.
7 8
Broker-dealers are also subject to Rule 15c3-1 79 (the "net capi-
tal" rule). This rule states that broker-dealers who are engaged in
a general securities business shall not permit aggregate indebted-
ness to exceed fifteen times (eight times during the first year of
business) the amount of net capital invested in the business, and
the value of net capital itself shall at all times be at least $25,000.80
On the other hand, those who promptly transmit all funds and se-
curities, and who do not otherwise hold customer funds or securi-
ties, are permitted to operate with as little as $5,000 or even $2,500
in net capital.8 1
Once again, the SEC has recognized that investment advisers
ought to be subject to financial responsibility standards.8 2 How-
ever, because the Commission doubts the applicability of the net
capital concept in the adviser context, it has only sought the
authority from Congress to promulgate such standards as it shall
see fit.83
Regulating Integrity
Unlike investment advisers, broker-dealers are subject to an ex-
77. Id. E-4.
78. Id. Unlike the Exchange Act, the Advisers Act and the NASD rules, the
NYSE requires that an applicant for membership be at least 21 years of age. 2
N.Y.S.E. GUIDE (CCH) 1402.
79. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(a)(1)(1977).
80. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(a) (1) (1977). The capital needed to become a mem-
ber of the NYSE is identical to that required before one may conduct a general
securities business under the Exchange Act. See also text accompanying notes 79-
83 supra, This is true unless one elects to use the alternative net capital require-
ment: minimum net capital of $100,000 (using a less rigorous method of computa-
tion) without any concomitant aggregate indebtedness criterion. See 17 C.F.R. §
240.15c3-1 (f) (1) (a) (1977). However, broker-dealer members of the NYSE are os-
tensibly susceptible to additional provisions which affect their ability to increase
business. See N.Y.S.E. GUIDE (CCH) 2326(a), 2326(b). Assuming that broker-
dealers are subject to these provisions and that they carry customer accounts,
they must not expand their business in such a way as to push aggregate indebted-
ness beyond 10 times the value of net capital for more than 15 consecutive busi-
ness days. Id. Also, if the ratio should increase to 12 times net capital for the
same length of time, they must actually reduce their business so as to bring it
back to 10 times net capital. Id.
81. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(a) (2), (3) (1977).
82. See SEC Proposals, supra note 1, at E-4 to E-5.
83. Id. E-5.
plicit general business standard as well as various antifraud pro-
visions. Article III, Section I of the Rules of Fair Practice of the
NASD (which is not materially different from SEC Rule 15b1O-284
applicable to nonmembers) provides: "A member, in the conduct
of his business, shall observe high standards of commercial honor
and just and equitable principles of trade."85 Although it embod-
ies a broad, all-encompassing requirement, four factors cast doubt
on the importance of such a standard. First, the Board of Gover-
nors has limited the scope of this standard by rendering various
interpretations dealing with specific situations.8 6 As an example,
one interpretation discusses only advertising, market letters, and
recruiting of sales personnel.87 Needless to say, if the fact situa-
tion falls within the ambit of one of the specific interpretations,
the general business standard is not directly applicable. A second
limiting factor of greater significance is the question of the extent
to which such a standard covers conduct which cannot be reached
by the antifraud provisions governing the behavior of broker-deal-
ers. It seems that the SEC believed it reached some conduct not
already made unlawful, otherwise it would not have promulgated
such a rule for SECO broker-dealers. However, it may have acted
merely with the idea of providing symmetry in the rules gov-
erning NASD and SECO broker-dealers. Third, even though such
a standard may reach conduct which falls short of "fraud" as de-
fined in the federal securities laws, it still may be unnecessary. If
a broker-dealer rendering investment advice is regarded as a
84. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15bi0-2 (1977).
85. NASD MANUAL (CCH) $ 2151. The general business standard applicable to
members of the NYSE is as follows:
Every member, allied member and member organization shall at all times
adhere to the principles of good business practice in the conduct of his or
its business affairs.
2 N.Y.S.E. GUIDE (CCH) 1 2401.
The chief difference between this standard and the comparable NASD or SECO
standard is the absence of the adjective "high", or an equivalent thereof. Whereas
the NASD/SECO provision holds broker-dealers to "high standards of commercial
honor", the NYSE simply requires adherence to "principles of good business prac-
tice". Based upon this discrepancy, and, possibly, the fact that the NASD/SECO
standard also demands observance of "just and equitable principles of trade", this
norm appears to be somewhat less stringent than the similar NASD/SECO provi-
sion. This may make a difference in the duty owed by the broker-dealer to his cus-
tomer. For example, it could be argued that broker-dealers who issue
recommendations concerning the securities of companies, of which they are repre-
sented on the board of directors, must disclose this information in the newsletter
but that the similarly situated NASD or SECO broker-dealer is under no such ob-
ligation.
86. These include, among others, advertising, corporate financing, execution of
retail transactions in the over-the-counter market, and receipt and delivery of se-
curities.
87. See NASD MAMiAL (CCH) 2151, at 2017-20.
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fiduciary without an explicit provision to that effect,88 then he will
be held to a high standard of conduct. Fiduciary standards may
not be identical to "high standards of commercial honor and just
and equitable principles of trade," but the courts may overlook
such distinctions.
Finally, in the case of broker-dealers who advise clients on an
individual basis, there is the question of the extent to which such
a standard covers conduct which cannot be reached by what is
known as the "suitability doctrine." For SECO broker-dealers,
the doctrine is as follows:
Every nonmember broker or dealer and every associated person who rec-
ommends to a customer the purchase, sale or exchange of any security
shall have reasonable ground to believe that the recommendation is not
unsuitable for such customer on the basis of information furnished by
such customer after reasonable inquiry concerning the customer's invest-
ment objectives, financial situation and needs, and any other information
known by such broker or dealer or associated person.89
The NASD rules include a matching suitability standard for mem-
ber broker-dealers, but it contains some variations which may be
of consequence.9 0 For all of the above reasons as well as the fact
88. See Michigan Comment, supra note 48, at 1228-32.
89. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15b10-3 (1977). SECO broker-dealers are also under an ex-
plicit duty to keep records of a customer's occupation, financial situation, marital
status, investment objectives, etc., unless the customer refuses to furnish such in-
formation after reasonable inquiry. See id. § 240.15b10-6(a) (1) (B), (C) and 2
N.Y.S.E. GUIDE (CCH) 2405(1).
90. The most important of these variations is the omission of language which
would require NASD broker-dealers to make a reasonable inquiry of their custom-
ers as to investment objectives, financial situation and needs, etc. One author has
suggested that the words "if any" be interpreted in such a way as to merely reflect
an awareness that, in some situations, a broker-dealer may not be able to obtain
all the information that may be necessary to determine the customer's financial
situation, investment objectives, etc. Mundheim, Professional Responsibilities of
Broker-Dealers: The Suitability Doctrine, 1965 DUKE L.J. 445, 473. An inquiry is re-
quired of both SECO and NYSE broker-dealers. In addition, instead of stating
that recommendations shall not be unsuitable, the NASD standard mandates that
they actually be suitable. Associated persons are not explicitly covered, and, ap-
parently in place of mentioning "investment objectives", the NASD standard re-
fers to "other security holdings." Compare NASD MANUAL (CCH) 2152 with 2
N.Y.S.E. GuIDE (CCH) 2405(1) and 17 C.F.R. § 240.15 b10-3 (1977).
A policy statement accompanying the NASD standard also specifically prohibits
(1) recommending speculative low-priced securities to customers without attempt-
ing to ascertain the customers' security holdings, financial situation, etc., (2) ex-
cessive trading in a customer's account, (3) trading in (as opposed to investing in)
mutual fund shares, (4) recommending the purchase of securities in amounts
which reasonably exceed the customer's financial capability, and (5) any of sev-
eral other examples of fraudulent activity. See NASD MANuAL (CCH) 2152, at
2051-53.
NASD broker-dealers, SECO broker-dealers and NYSE broker-dealers are all
that investment advisers rendering particularized advice are also
subject to the suitability doctrine, 91 there seems to be no need to
develop a general business standard applicable to investment ad-
visers.
The counterpart of the general antifraud provision of the Advis-
ers Act (Section 206) is Section 15(c) of the Securities Exchange
Act.92 It provides, broadly, that broker-dealers may not engage in
prohibited from "churning" discretionary accounts. See NASD MANUAL (CCH) I
2165(a); 17 C.F.R. § 240.15cl-7(a) (1977); 2 N.Y.S.E. GuIDz (CCH) 2408(c). How-
ever, unlike the others, the NYSE provision does not indicate that excessive trad-
ing be viewed in terms of both the financial resources of the customer and the
character of the account. See 2 N.Y.S.E. GUIDE (CCH) 2408(c). The NYSE also
forbids its members from executing purchases or sales which are excessive either
in relation to the member's financial resources or the market for the security. Id.
2435(1). NYSE broker-dealers are subject to a standard similar to the suitability
doctrine by virtue of the fact that they are under an obligation to diligently dis-
cover the essential facts about every customer account. Id. 2405(1).
91. See SEC Proposals, supra note 1, at E-6.
92. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 15(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c) (1976). Section
15(c) applies only to recommendations of or transactions in securities traded on
exchanges of which the broker-dealers are not members. Nevertheless, other pro-
visions (namely exchange rules, see e.g., 2 N.Y.S.E. GUIDE (CCH) 2435(4), (5);
rules of the NASD, see NASD MANUAL (CCH) 11 2161, 2168, and antifraud provi-
sions located elsewhere in the federal securities laws, see Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, §§ 9(a)(5), 10b and Rule lob-5 thereunder, and Securities Act of 1933, §
17(b)) reach situations which involve securities traded on exchanges of which bro-
ker-dealers are members.
Rule lOb-3, which contains language closely paralleling the language of section
15(c) (1), is not even as comprehensive as section 15(c)(1). In certain situations it
may reach types of securities exempted from the operation of section 15(c) (1)
(e.g., commercial paper and commercial bills), but otherwise its repeal would have
no effect.
The NYSE rules contain a number of provisions applicable to the investment
advisory function of broker-dealers which are directed toward their integrity.
First, no member may cause the purchase or sale of any security to be executed
on the exchange at successively higher or lower prices, respectively, for the pur-
pose of (1) creating or inducing a misleading appearance of activity in such secur-
ity, (2) improperly influencing the market price of such security, or of (3) setting a
price which does not reflect the true state of the market for such security. 2
N.Y.S.E. GUIDE (CCH) 2435(3). Second, there is a prohibition against participat-
ing in or having an interest in the profits of a manipulative operation. Id.
2435(4). Although "manipulative operation" is nowhere defined in the rules, it
seems clear that this term refers to action-either individual or joint-designed to
unfairly influence the market(price of any security for the purpose of making a
profit. See id. This provision closely parallels Section 9(a) (3) of the Exchange Act.
Unlike section 9(a)(3) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a) (3) (1976), this provi-
sion reaches securities which are not registered on a national securities exchange
and covers manipulative statements in a newsletter other than those which simply
indicate that the price of a security will rise or fall due to the market operations of
certain persons. However, other antifraud provisions applicable to all broker-deal-
ers, see, particularly, text accompanying notes 93-100, infra, almost certainly
render any distinctions meaningless. A further provision of the NYSE rules for-
bids circulation of sensational rumors in a way that might reasonably be expected
to affect market conditions on the 2 N.Y.S.E. GUIDE (CCH) 1 2435(5), but this, too,
is an example of conduct which is proscribed by other laws or regulations. See
text accompanying notes 93-98 infra.
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any manipulative, deceptive or other fraudulent act or practice to
effect any transaction in, or to induce or attempt to induce the
The only other relevant rules of the NYSE aimed specifically at the integrity of
broker-dealers deal with the preparation and distribution of investment newslet-
ters. Prior to dissemination to the public, newsletters must be approved by a
member or allied member of the Exchange or by a competent, authorized dele-
gate. 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 2472. Members who prepare newsletters generally
must keep copies thereof for three years. The copies must contain the names of
persons who prepared the material and the names of those who approved its dis-
tribution. See id.
NYSE provisions also regulate the form of newsletters (and advertisements).
See Id. 2474A. Many of the requirements duplicate those contained in the NASD
rules, but there are some exceptions. First, although both the NYSE and the
NASD require members who issue current recommendations in newsletters to in-
dicate whether officers or employees of the issuing organization hold any options
in the recommended securities, the NASD provision may provide a loophole by
not compelling disclosure where the value of such options is "nominal." NASD
MAUAL (CCH) 2151.01, at 2019. On the other hand, the NASD provision man-
dates disclosure of rights and warrants whenever their holding is significant. Id.
Second, NYSE members--but not members of the NASD-must reveal whether
they managed or co-managed the most recent public offering of any securities of
the recommended issuer. 2 N.Y.S.E. GuIDE (CCH) 2474.10, at 4028. Third, if the
broker-dealer chooses to disclose any insider relationships (e.g., directorates) be-
tween him and the recommended issuer, only the NYSE provisions indicate that
the firm "should be careful to avoid exploiting these relationships by implying that
the recommendation is based directly or indirectly on privileged information." Id.
There are substantial similarities with regard to past recommendations as well.
The NYSE covers all topics mentioned by the NASD. All of the rules which gov-
ern the use of past recommendations-Advisers Act Rule 206-4(1), the NASD in-
terpretation, and the NYSE provisions-provide that the period covered must
extend to at least one year. Only the Advisers Act requires inclusion of all securi-
ties recommendations in the promotional material; both the NASD and the NYSE
permit use of all recommendations within a distinct category of securities.
Compare 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-i (1977) with NASD MANuAL (CCH) 2151.01 and 2
N.Y.S.E. GUME (CCH) $ 2474A.10. The NYSE covers all topics mentioned by the
NASD and adds a few of its own. These place greater obligations on the broker-
dealer when a list is offered, but not included, in the material (in this instance the
offering must state how many issues were recommended, and how many of these
advanced and declined), or when a record of past recommendations is presented
in summary form. 2 N.Y.S.E. GUIDE (CCH) 2474A.10. Neither the Advisers Act
nor the NASD rules mention use of such a summary; presumably it could not be
employed legally under those provisions. If used by a member of the NYSE, a fie
of the original recommendations upon which the summary is based must be kept
by the member firm and be available to the NYSE on request for three years. If
such a summary is published but subsequently discontinued, it will be allowed to
begin again only if the intervening juncture is included in the published summary.
Finally, the purchase price of a given number of shares must be shown for each of
the recommended securities, commissions must be mentioned, and it must be
made clear that the results claimed would have been obtained only if each issue
had been purchased when recommended and then sold when sale was recom-
mended. Id.
As under the NASD interpretation, the use of testimonials is permitted under
limited circumstances. The NYSE rules indicate, however, that payment of nomi-
purchase or sale of, any security other than on a national securi-
ties exchange of which they are members.93 As was the case
under Section 206 of the Advisers Act, 94 the Commission may de-
fine and prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent "fraudu-
lent, deceptive, or manipulative" practices. 95 It may also define
the meaning of "fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative" devices
or contrivances. 96
Rule 15cl-2, which was among the first to define the meaning of
such devices or contrivances, indicates that the language of the
provision is intended to reach:
(1) . . . any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person9 7 or,
(2) .. . any untrue statement of a material fact and any omission to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in
the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading
which statement or omission is made with knowledge or reasonable
grounds to believe that it is untrue or misleading.
98
If this language is compared with the language of Section 206 of
the Advisers Act,99 two conclusions emerge. First, subparagraph
(2) of Section 206 was probably modeled after paragraph (1) of
Rule 15cl-2, above. 00 The Advisers Act provision, however, is re-
stricted to clients and does not include an act which, in the future,
would operate as a fraud or deceit. Second, a counterpart to para-
graph (2), above, is absent from Section 206 of the Advisers Act,
although it does appear in Section 207 of that Act, dealing with re-
gistration applications and reports. The logical inference that
arises from this omission (and from the insertion of this language
in Section 207) is that Section 206 was not intended to provide a
cause of action against one who utters an untrue statement of a
material fact or a statement made misleading by the omission of a
material fact. Therefore, the only way such a suit can be brought
against an investment adviser is under Rule lOb-5 of the Ex-
change Act, in which case the aggrieved party would have to
demonstrate that he was the purchaser or seller of a security and
that the adviser's conduct was more egregious than mere negli-
nal consideration to obtain the testimonial need not be reported, and that the
qualifications of an expert who gives a testimonial need not be disclosed. See id.
93. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 15(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c) (1976).
94. See text preceding note 27 supra.
95. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 15(c)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c) (2) (1976).
96. Id. § 15(c)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(1) (1976).
97. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15cl-2(a) (1977).
98. Id. § 240.15cl-2(b).
99. See text accompanying notes 25-26 supra.
100. Section 206 of the Advisers Act was enacted after Rule 15cl-2 was promul-
gated under the Exchange Act, and contains quite similar language. Section 206
and Rule 15cl-2, as well as Rule lOb-5, are all modeled after Section 17(a) of the
Securities Act of 1933. See 2 L. Loss, SECuRrrIES REGULATION 1392 3 id. 1427
(1961).
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gence.10 1 Specific antifraud provisions applicable to broker-deal-
ers also parallel some of the provisions found in the Advisers
Act.102
101. Cases decided by the United States Supreme Court construing section
10(b) and Rule lOb-5 have held that a private plaintiff who brings an action for
damages thereunder must establish scienter on the part of the defendant and
must himself have been a purchaser or seller of the securities involved in the law-
suit. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
102. For example, broker-dealers who knowingly file false or misleading docu-
ments with the Commission are liable to persons who (not knowing the statement
was false or misleading) relied upon it to buy or sell securities and sustained dam-
ages as a result. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 18(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1976).
A person who so relied to his detriment can either sue in equity or at law, and can
recover costs plus reasonable attorneys' fees in addition to consequential dam-
ages. Id. A similar liability arises under Section 207 of the Advisers Act for a false
statement or a wilful omission of material fact contained in the registration appli-
cation (or amendments thereto) or in records required to be fied under Section
204 of the Advisers Act. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 207, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-7
(1976). However, this comparable provision fails to reach other documents filed by
investment advisers under that Act (e.g., papers and books filed pursuant to an
investigation by the SEC). Also, a person who relies upon Section 207 may not be
able to bring suit for an injunction or damages, let alone recover attorneys' fees,
because it is doubtful whether a person has a right to a private cause of action
under any provision of the Advisers Act. See text accompanying notes 49-52
supra.
A second example is found in Section 26 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
15 U.S.C. § 78z (1976), and Rule 15cl-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15cl-2 (1977). These provi-
sions generally do not permit broker-dealers to represent that the Commission or
the Federal Reserve Board has passed upon their abilities or qualifications. The
only differences between these provisions and Section 208 of the Advisers Act is
that the latter (1) covers all agencies of the United States Government, (2) is
phrased in somewhat broader language, and (3) explicitly permits registered ad-
visers (or registered broker-dealers) to state that they are registered so long as
they do not misrepresent the effect of the registration. For all practical purposes,
these prohibitions are identical.
Still another instance of similarity appears in the regulations applicable to in-
vestment newsletters or advertisements. Here, the relevant comparison is be-
tween an interpretation issued by the NASD pursuant to the general business
standard, cited above, (applicable to member broker-dealers only), and Rule
205(4)-i of the Advisers Act. The text of the NASD interpretation is as follows:
It shall be deemed a violation ... for a member, directly or indirectly, to
publish, circulate or distribute any advertisement, sales literature or mar-
ket letter that the member knows or has reason to know contains any un-
true statement of a material fact or is otherwise false or misleading.
NASD MANUAL (CCH) 2151.01, at 2017.
Except for the phrase "knows or has reason to know," the substantive import of
this standard is found in subparagraph (5) of Rule 206(4)-i under the Advisers
Act. Broker-dealers who are not members of the NASD are subject to a similar
standard of misrepresentation applicable to both oral and written advice ("any
statement") whose purpose is to induce the purchase or sale of a security regis-
tered on a national securities exchange. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §
55
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9(a) (4), 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a) (4) (1976). (This provision also applies to broker-dealers
who are members of the NASD.)
Considerable explanation accompanies the interpretation. The broad language
provides that advertisements and market letters should be premised upon the
principles of good faith and fair dealing, should furnish an adequate basis for eval-
uating the underlying facts, and should not omit material facts or qualifications
which would cause the advertisement or newsletter to be misleading. NASD MAN-
UAL (CCH) 2151.01, at 2017.
Like Rule 206(4)-1, the narrow instructions deal with such items as recommen-
dations, testimonials, and offers of free service. In the case of current recommen-
dations, which are not mentioned in Rule 206(4)-1, the interpretation requires
(1) that a reasonable basis for the recommendation exists, and (2) that informa-
tion supporting the recommendation be furnished to the public upon request. Id.
2151.01, at 2018-19. It also indicates that the following facts are to be disclosed:
the price at the time the original recommendation was made, whether the broker-
dealer usually makes a market in the recommended securities, and whether the
broker-dealer intends to buy or sell recommended securities for his own account
or owns the rights to purchase the recommended securities (unless such owner-
ship is nominal). Id. As for the use of past recommendations, however, Rule
206(4)-i mandates the use of a cautionary legend regarding the relevance of past
recommendations to future investment performance. See note 27 supra. In place
of the disclaimer required by the interpretation that, if applicable, the recommen-
dations were made during a rising market, Rule 206(4)-i demands insertion of re-
cent market prices for the securities that were previously recommended. While
testimonials are entirely prohibited by Rule 206(4)-i, the interpretation permits
them to be employed so long as certain criteria are satisfied. See NASD MANUAL
(CCH) 2151.01, at 2019. These criteria include: (1) clarification that past perform-
ance is not necessarily indicative of future performance, (2) a statement indicating
whether or not any compensation has been paid to the maker of the testimonial,
and (3) if the testimonial implies a specialized opinion, there must be a statement
listing the qualifications of the person who made the testimonial. Id. Offers of free
services are treated identically so that, if certain requirements are complied with,
they may be utilized.
The interpretation also deals with items ignored by Rule 206(4)-i. For example,
newsletters and advertisements issued by member broker-dealers must contain
the following information: the name of the person or firm that prepared the mate-
rial if not prepared by the member, the date on which the material was first pub-
lished, and if the material is not current, a statement to this effect. Id. 2151.01, at
2018. Members may not imply access to research facilities beyond those that they
actually can provide, may not make promises of specific results, may not make ex-
aggerated or unwarranted claims, and may not issue forecasts of future events un-
less they are clearly labeled as such. Id. 2151.01, at 2019. At the same time, Rule
206(4)-i contains one provision not found in the interpretation: if an investment
adviser asserts that any graph, chart, formula, or similar device can be used to as-
sist in making investment decisions, or can be employed to make such decision,
the difficulties associated with such use must be prominently disclosed. 17 C.F.R.
§ 275.206(4)-i (1977).
The interpretation does not exhaust the list of specific antifraud provisions ap-
plicable to broker-dealers. Those who are members of the NASD may not report
purchases or sales of securities or quote the price of securities in their newsletters
unless they believe such transactions and/or prices are bona fide. NASD MANUAL
(CCH) 2155; see also Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 11A(c)(1), 15 U.S.C. §
78k-1(c)(1) (1976). Broker-dealers, regardless of affiliation, may not induce the
purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange by
circulating a newsletter to the effect that the price of any such security is likely to
rise or fall because of the market operations of one or more persons conducted for
the purpose of raising or lowering the price of such security. Securities Exchange
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ker-dealers to similar provisions applicable to investment advis-
ers indicates that differences exist. Sanctions cannot be invoked
against an adviser for conduct which would operate as a fraud
upon any person, or apparently, for the making of an untrue or
materially misleading statement where the purchase or sale of a
security is not shown.103 Nor is an adviser subject to detailed dis-
closure requirements relating to the issuance of current invest-
ment recommendations. 104 If an adviser is to be held liable for
being involved in an operation designed to manipulate the price
of a security, receipt of consideration must be demonstrated. 05
On the other hand, broker-dealers are not subject to any specific
rules governing investment advisory contracts that they enter
into with their clients. l0 6
Act of 1934, § 9 (a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(3) (1976). Unlike a similar provision
which reaches investment advisers, receipt of consideration need not be shown. A
like provision in the rules of the NASD prohibits members from giving anything of
value to any person for the purpose of influencing such person in connection with
the publication or circulation of a newsletter on any matter which is intended to
have, or does have, an effect upon the market price of any security. See NASD
MANUAL (CCH) 2161. Also, broker-dealers may not induce the purchase or sale
of (1) any security whose registration has been suspended or revoked. Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, § 12(j), 15 U.S.C. § 781(j) (1976); or (2) any security in which
trading has been suspended by the SEC. Id. § 12(k), 15 U.S.C. § 781(k) (1976). Fi-
nally, broker-dealers may not attempt to induce the purchase or sale of any secur-
ity that must be validated under any applicable validation law of the Federal
Republic of Germany, unless specified conditions are met. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-3
(1977).
103. See text accompanying notes 97-101 supra.
104. It should be noted that SECO broker-dealers are also not subject to such
detailed requirements. The fact that the SEC abandoned its effort to promulgate a
rule in this area-which would have subjected all broker-dealers to detailed stand-
ards, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-8425 (Oct. 10, 1968), (rescinded on
Feb. 25, 1976)-should not be used as an argument against standardizing these re-
quirements. Apparently, the Commission rescinded its proposed rule in response
to objections from the NASD and the exchanges that (1) the existing provisions
had not been shown to be inadequate, (2) if new standards were needed, the nor-
mal procedure would be to amend the provisions of the self-regulatory organiza-
tion instead of issuing a new SEC rule, and (3) the proposed rule would have been
too difficult to administer. Assuming that the NASD interpretation can be en-
forced and that specific requirements are necessary (as the SEC has asserted),
SECO broker-dealers should not be governed solely by a provision which prohib-
its circulation of misleading or untrue newsletters whose purpose is to induce the
purchase or sale of a security registered on a national securities exchange.
105. See last paragraph of note 104 supra.
106. The Exchange Act does invalidate waiver of compliance, by contract or
otherwise, with any provision of the Act, or any rule or regulation thereunder. Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934, § 29(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (1976). Compliance with
orders may be waived under the Exchange Act, see note 174 infra, as may compli-
Enforcement Mechanisms
The Exchange Act monitors the behavior of broker-dealers
more closely than the Advisers Act monitors the behavior of ad-
visers.10 7 As was the case with the Advisers Act, the SEC is re-
ance with the rules of the NASD. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 29(a), 15
U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (1976).
Minor differences between regulation of broker-dealers and investment advisers
also exist in the situation where an investment adviser acts in a broker or dealer
capacity for an advisory client. Compare Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §
11(d)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78k(d)(2) (1976) with Investment Advisers Act of 1940, §
206(3) (1976).
107. Section 17 of the Exchange Act requires broker-dealers who transact a
business in securities through a member of a national securities exchange, inter
alia, to make and keep records, and to maintain these records for inspection, at
any time, by representatives of the Commission. Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
§ 17(a),(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78q(a),(b) (1976). The records required to be kept are enu-
merated in Rules 17a-3 and 17a-4. 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-3, 17a-4 (1977). These include
ledgers which itemize purchases and sales for each customer account, ledgers
which reflect all assets, liabilities, income, expense and capital accounts. Id. §
240.17a-3(a) (2), (3), copies of all communications sent by the broker-dealer relat-
ing to the business, and all written agreements (or copies thereof) between the
broker-dealer and his customers. Id. § 240.17a-4(b) (4), (7). Some records must be
kept for six years, others for three years, but all must be preserved for the first
two years in an easily accessible location. See id. §§ 240.15b10-6(e), 17a-4(a), (b).
These rules apply to all registered broker-dealers. If the broker-dealer is a mem-
ber of the NASD or NYSE, and if his employees are registered with either organi-
zation, then the retention of a copy of the complete registration application is
deemed to satisfy the requirement in Rule 17a-3 that an application for employ-
ment executed by each employee shall be kept by the broker-dealer. See id. §
240.17a-3(a) (12).
Section 17 also mandates that all broker-dealers (including partners, directors,
officers and employees thereof) shall be fingerprinted. Securities Exchange Act of
1934, § 17(f) (2), 15 U.S.C. § 78q(f) (2) (1976). The SEC has, however, adopted a rule
that permanently exempts certain classes of employees from being fingerprinted.
These exempted personnel are temporary employees, persons not engaged in the
sale of securities, persons who have no access to the handling or processing of se-
curities or original books and records relating thereto, and persons who do not
have direct supervisory responsibility over persons engaged in the above activi-
ties. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-12214 (Mar. 16, 1976). All registered
broker-dealers shall annually fie a certified balance sheet and income statement
with the Commission. Id. § 17(e)(1)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 78q(e)(1)(A) (1976). Unless
the broker-dealer is a member of a national securities exchange or of the NASD,
which organization maintains the required information and transmits such infor-
mation to the SEC pursuant to a plan approved by the SEC, he will also be re-
quired to file monthly and quarterly reports on his financial condition. See 17
C.F.R. § 240.17a-5(1)-4 (1978). Similarly, if at any time during a single month a bro-
ker-dealer's aggregate indebtedness exceeds 12 times the value of his net capital,
or if his total net capital falls below 120 percent of the minimum net capital re-
quired of him, he must give appropriate notice to the Commission. See id. §
240.17a-11(b). Reports must be fied monthly until, for three consecutive months,
aggregate indebtedness is not greater than 200 percent of net capital and total net
capital does not fall below 120 percent of the required level. Id. A broker-dealer is
also under an obligation to notify the SEC and the appropriate regulatory organi-
zation whenever his net capital falls below that required of him by any net capital
rule to which he is subject. See id. § 240.17a-11(a). Except where the broker-
dealer is either (1) granted an exemption by the Commission or (2) trades only
shares of registered investment companies and participations in insurance com-
[Vol. 6: 31, 1978] Advising the Individual Investor
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
sponsible for enforcing the provisions of the Securities Exchange
pany separate accounts and does not handle the funds or securities of customers,
he must verify the whereabouts of securities under his control once each quarter.
See id. § 240.17a-13(a) (2), (b). Unless an exception applies, all registered broker-
dealers generally must file annual audited reports containing a statement of
financial condition, a statement of changes in the equity of the owners, and a
statement of changes in liabilities which are subordinated to the claims of general
creditors along with various supporting documents. See id. § 240.17a-5(d) (2)-(6).
(One exception may be relevant to broker-dealers who advise individual clients:
broker-dealers who forward all transactions to a clearing broker on a fully dis-
closed basis and who do not hold client funds or securities may be exempted (1) if
the clearing broker records such transactions on his book in the names of the cus-
tomers of the originating broker-dealer and (2) if the originating broker-dealer's
business is limited to this activity or this activity in combination with other ex-
empted activities. See id.) Within 45 days after these materials are filed with the
Commission the broker-dealer must furnish additional financial reports to the
Commission, to the NYSE and NASD if he is a member thereof, and to his cus-
tomers. See id. § 240.17a-5(c)(1), (2). The NASD also requires a member to disc-
lose financial information contained in its most recent balance sheet to customers
upon request. NASD MANuAL (CCH) 2172.
Section 17 and the rules thereunder do not, however, exhaust the list of monitor-
ing requirements. Broker-dealers must keep and preserve information on cus-
tomer accounts and written complaints submitted by customers. Id. 17 C.F.R. §
240.15610-6(a)-(d) (1977). If they are members of the NASD they must retain a
separate record of both payments made and gifts or gratuities received, of written
employment contracts between the member and outside persons, and the compen-
sation paid pursuant thereto. NASD MANUAL (CCH) 2160. Each broker-dealer
must organize a system for supervising employees according to written proce-
dures which, among other things, provide that a designated supervisor shall re-
view and give written approval to newsletters before they are circulated. Id. $
2177; 17 C.F.R. § 240.15b10-4 (1977). The supervisor may be a partner, officer or
manager, or any other qualified person. The supervisor of an NASD member must
be a partner, officer, or office manager. ,See NASD MANUAL (CCH) 2177. Sub-
scription investment advisers are not under an affirmative duty to keep any of
these records or to organize such a system of supervision, but in the latter in-
stance, sanctions may be placed upon them for failing to reasonably supervise
their employees. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 203(e) (5), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-
3(e) (5) (1976).
Within six months of the grant of registration, each broker-dealer must be in-
spected by the SEC, or an industry regulatory organization appointed by the SEC,
to ascertain whether the broker-dealer is operating in conformity with the Securi-
ties Exchange Act and the rules and regulations thereunder. Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, § 15(b) (2) (C), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b) (2) (C) (1976). The inspection is per-
formed because various studies demonstrated that, of those broker-dealers whose
businesses eventually failed, many experienced difficulties during the first few
months following registration.
The rules governing use of customer funds and securities are substantially simi-
lar to the requirements pertaining to investment advisers. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.8c-
1(c); 240.15c2-1(c) (1977). Rule 15c2-1 and Rule 8c-1 are identical except that Rule
8c-1 applies only to members of national securities exchanges and to broker-deal-
ers who transact a securities business through a member of such exchange, while
Rule 15c2-1 reaches all broker-dealers. Compare id. § 240.8c-1(a) with id. §
240.15c2-1 (a). Rule 15c2-1 represents another exercise by the Commission of its
Act applicable to broker-dealers. Here, however, it is clear that
power to define a "fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative act or practice" under
section 15(c) (2) of the Exchange Act.
Unless an exemption applies, a broker-dealer may not hypothecate or pledge
customer securities if this would allow customer securities to be commingled,
without first obtaining the written consent of all customers involved. Id. §§ 240.8c-
l(a)(1); 240.15c2-1(a)(1). NASD members may not lend customer's securities
without such a written authorization even where commingling would not result.
See NASD MANuAL (CCH) I 2169(b). Except where the authorization specifies
the particular securities to be pledged, NASD broker-dealers may not lend a cus-
tomer's securities in an amount which is not reasonably related to the customer's
indebtedness to them, nor may they lend securities of customers which have been
fully paid for. See id. 2169, at 2091, 2092. NASD broker-dealers are also subject to
a general standard which states that no member or person associated with a mem-
ber may use customer funds or securities improperly. Id. I 2169(a). A broker-
dealer is not generally permitted to pledge customer securities if the value of
loans thereon would exceed the value of such customers' indebtedness to him.
See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.8c-1(a) (3), 240.15c2-1(a) (3) (1977). A NASD broker-dealer may
not enter into any agreement with a customer which would allow the broker-
dealer to lend customer securities for an amount in excess of the customer's in-
debtedness to the broker-dealer. NASD MANUAL (CCH) 2170(b).
Certain safeguards must be provided which protect customer funds under the
control of a broker-dealer from being used in his business. See 17 C.F.R. §
240.15c3-2 (1977). Unless a broker-dealer is subject to state or federal banking au-
thorities, or does not carry any customer funds which customers may withdraw at
any time, or segregates such funds as to preclude their use by him, he must ad-
here to certain practices if he wishes to use the funds. See id. Ordinarily the bro-
ker-dealer is obligated to promptly obtain and keep control of customer securities
to the extent that such securities exceed the amount owed to him by customers,
and to maintain a separate bank account for the exclusive benefit of customers
which holds the excess of total credits over total debits required to be deposited.
See id. § 240.15c3-3(b), (e). These securities include those that have been fully
paid for by customers, and "excess margin securities". Excess margin securities
are defined as securities placed in margin accounts which have a market value in
excess of 140 percent of the total debit balances in such accounts. See id. §
240.15c3-3(a) (3)-(5).
NASD broker-dealers may share in the profits or losses of customer accounts.
See NASD MANUAL (CCH) 2169(f). A NASD member or person associated
therewith may participate in the profits or losses of a customer's account only if
(1) he obtains prior written authorization from such member and (2) he shares in
the gains or losses in direct proportion to the financial contributions made to the
account by him. SECO broker-dealers may do likewise, as apparently there is no
provision which prevents them from acting in this manner. NYSE members are
flatly prohibited from participating in customer accounts. See N.Y.S.E. GUME
(CCH) 2369. By virtue of the provision in the Advisers Act which forbids fees
based upon the capital appreciation of a client's portfolio, investment advisers are
presumably prohibited from sharing in the profits or losses of customer accounts
only if such gains or losses can be regarded as fees for services rendered.
A number of additional procedures must be complied with if the broker-dealer
wishes to manage discretionary accounts. Prior written authorization must be ob-
tained from the customer in order to manage the account on a discretionary basis,
and such authorization is required to be approved in writing by a designated su-
pervisor. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15b10-4(c)(4), 5(a) (1977); NASD MANUAL (CCH)
2165(b); 2 N.Y.S.E. GUIDE (CCH) 2408(a), (b). SECO broker-dealers must also
be informed of the reasons why such discretionary authority has been granted.
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15b10-5(a) (1977). Orders entered on a discretionary basis must
be identified as such, and also must receive prompt written approval by the super-
visor. 17 C.F.R. §240.15b10-4(c)(4), 17a-3(a)(6) (1977); NASD MANUAL (CCH)
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this is a shared responsibility: private plaintiffs may sue to en-
2165(c); 2 N.Y.S.E. GUIDE (CCH) 2408(b). If the broker-dealer is a member of the
NASD or NYSE, he is under an explicit duty to review all discretionary accounts
at frequent intervals. NASD MANUAL (CCH) 2165(c); 2 N.Y.S.E. GUIDE (CCH)
2408(b). On the other hand, SECO broker-dealers are subject to specific provi-
sions which require them to keep detailed records of all transactions for discre-
tionary accounts. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.15b10-6(d), 240.15cl-7(b) (1977). NASD
broker-dealers must record the age and occupation of the customer and the signa-
ture of each person authorized to exercise discretion over the account. NASD
MAIUAL (CCH) 2171(b). Like investment advisers, all broker-dealers who have
investment discretion must maintain records of the granting of discretionary au-
thority, 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-4(b) (6) (1977), and are required to make disclosure of
commission practices and holdings of equity securities. See note 35 supra.
The NYSE monitors compliance with the law in basically three different ways.
It requires each member to organize its own supervisory procedures, conducts au-
dits of members, and requires members to submit financial statements to the Ex-
change and to other interested persons.
Supervisory procedures comport with those found in the NASD or SECO rules,
but there are some differences. For instance, a broker-dealer who is not a NASD
member could delegate overall responsibility to a "qualified person", 17 C.F.R. §
240.15b10-4(b) (1977); under NYSE rules such a person must be a general partner
or principal executive officer. 2 N.Y.S.E. GUIDE (CCH) It 2342, 2405. However, un-
like the SECO or NASD rules, the NYSE explicitly directs the partner or officer in
charge of overall supervision to delegate responsibility for supervision to qualified
employees. Id. 2342. This directive probably also accounts for the fact that only
the NYSE provides for the creation of a separate system to monitor the perform-
ance of persons to whom supervisory authority has been delegated. Cf Id. The
SECO rules, however, contemplate that such authority will in fact be designated.
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15b10-4(b), (d) (1977). They provide that broker-dealers who
have designated more than one person as a supervisor must designate another
person or persons to supervise such supervisors and to periodically inspect each
business office of the broker-dealer to insure compliance with written procedures.
17 C.F.R. § 240.15blO-4(d) (1977).
Persons who are delegated supervisory power over one or more offices of a
NYSE member must have a creditable record as a NYSE registered representative
(or equivalent experience) and must pass a special examination. 2 N.Y.S.E. GUIDE
(CCH) 2342.13. There is an exception for small offices supervised by a non-resi-
dent supervisor. In this case a resident registered representative may serve as an
ancillary supervisor, and is not required to pass the examination or meet the expe-
rience requirements (e.g., creditable record as a registered representative). Id.
2342.15.
The examination and experience qualifications also apply to a person who su-
pervises an organized group of registered representatives. Id. 2342. No such re-
quirements are imposed upon branch managers by either the SECO or NASD
provisions. The same can be said for investment advisers under the Advisers Act;
they are subject to general guidelines only.
NYSE member organizations are audited at least once a year. See id. 2418.10.
The member may select the independent public accountant who will perform the
audit, and is aware of when the audit will occur. See id.
Finally, NYSE members must file documents with the Exchange or send them
to interested parties. Each month they must file a statement on financial and op-
erating condition. Id. $ 2416. Individual members must file the monthly reports
only if the Exchange requests them to do so, and are required to ifie an income
force provisions of the Exchange Act or Rules of the NASD, and
the NASD and the NYSE may enforce their rules against member
broker-dealers.
The NASD may investigate complaints submitted to it by ag-
grieved persons or it may initiate its own investigation.1 0 8 It can
and expense report (as well as additional financial information) when requested
to do so by the Exchange. Id. 1 2416, 2425. Member organizations are required to
send quarterly statements of accounts to customers who had a transaction during
the preceding quarter. Id. 2409. The statement must include a legend informing
the customer that a financial statement of such organization is available for per-
sonal inspection at the offices of the organization or that a copy of it will be mailed
upon receipt of written request. Id.
When this description of monitoring requirements is compared with the pre-
vious description for investment advisers and broker-dealers who are not mem-
bers of the NYSE it becomes clear that broker-dealers are monitored more closely
than investment advisers. The only provision applicable to investment advisers
which is not substantially duplicated by the Exchange Act is that investment ad-
visers must maintain a record of the reasons underlying their recommendations.
See 17 C.F.R. § 275.204-2(a)(11) (1977). On the other hand, the Advisers Act does
not mandate either submission of monthly or quarterly financial statement nor
does the Act require post-registration inspection (although advisers are routinely
inspected once every eight years). NYSE members are governed by the strictest
standards of all, followed by nonmember broker-dealers and then investment ad-
visers.
One must ask whether such an elaborate compliance system is necessary for
broker-dealers, especially those who render investment advice in the same man-
ner as subscription advisers, and who do not have custody of their customers'
funds or securities. Although this lack of custody may lead to an exemption from
filing of some of the documents, if other conditions are met, broker-dealers who do
not handle client funds or securities will not have to file with the SEC, nor furnish
to self-regulatory organizations or customers an annual balance sheet and net cap-
ital calculation, and will not be required to verify securities under his control on a
quarterly basis. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-5(c)(1), § 240.17a-13(a) (1977). Neverthe-
less, most filing requirements remain in force because they apply to all broker-
dealers. For the broker-dealer who competes with the subscription adviser, this
amounts to a case of overkill. A more reasonable scheme would subject such bro-
ker-dealers to recordkeeping burdens in accordance with the Advisers Act and to
a periodic audit primarily directed towards preserving the solvency of the adviser
and preventing misappropriation of prepaid fees.
108. NASD MANUAL (CCH) 2202-03. Like the NASD, the NYSE may investi-
gate alleged violations of Exchange rules and may require the parties involved to
produce books and papers or to testify before the Board of Directors (or a duly
authorized committee). See 2 N.Y.S.E. GuiDE (CCH) 1659. If a member, allied
member or approved person fails to comply, he may be suspended or expelled. Id.
Suspension, expulsion, or withdrawal may be invoked if a member, allied member
or approved person is found guilty of either making a material misstatement to the
Exchange or of making one in his application for approval. Id. 1655. Similarly, if
a member or allied member is adjudged guilty of a fraudulent or dishonest act
which was not disclosed in the application, or if he is found guilty of fraudulent
acts thereafter, he must be expelled from membership. See id. 1651-52. The ap-
proved person's approval would be withdrawn.
A member or allied member who engages in manipulative market operations
may be suspended or expelled. Id. 1652. If such a person is a general partner,
stockholder, officer or director of a member organization, he may be subject to the
same sanctions for any act or omission of such organization as for his own per-
sonal conduct. Id. 1667. As long as designated procedures are followed, mem-
bers and allied members may be investigated and disciplined even after their
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require a member or any associated person thereof to provide an
oral or written report of facts involved in the investigation and
may inspect relevant books and records. 0 9 If the member fails to
furnish duly requested documents, it may be suspended from
membership." 0 Violation of the rules, orders, directions, deci-
sions, or interpretations issued by the proper enforcement body
may result in a variety of sanctions. These include: censure, a
fine of up to $5,000, suspension of membership for a stated period,
expulsion from membership,"' suspension or barring a member
or associated person from association with other members, or any
other appropriate penalty.1 2 Disciplined parties may also have to
bear the costs of proceedings." 3 Finally, if any costs or fines are
imposed, the violator may be summarily suspended or expelled
association with the Exchange has been terminated. Id. 11674. In that case, the
former member or allied member may be fined up to $25,000, censured, and perma-
nently or temporarily barred from being a member, allied member, or employee of
a member organization. Id. 1674.
Members, allied members, and member organizations may also be disciplined
for what might be called general violations. Where any of them is adjudged guilty
of an act that "may be determined to be detrimental to the interest or welfare of
the Exchange" it may be suspended for as many as five years. Id. 1660. In addi-
tion, violation of the Exchange Constitution, rules, or any resolution of the Board
of Directors may result in suspension or expulsion. Id. 1656. (This provision
also applies to a director who is an approved person. In this case, the sanction is
withdrawal of approval. Id.). Wilful violation of any provision of the Exchange
Act or of a rule or regulation thereunder similarly may lead to suspension or ex-
pulsion. Id. 1657. In lieu of suspension or expulsion, when any current member,
allied member, or member organization commits any of the above-mentioned of-
fenses, a fine of up to $25,000 (up to $100,000 for a member organization) may be
levied, or the guilty party may be censured. See id. 1663.
The strength of these sanctions, when compared to those available under the
NASD rules, depends largely on the relative advantage of belonging to one organi-
zation as opposed to the other. If, for example, Exchange membership promises
greater rewards than does NASD membership (in terms of the cost of becoming a
member), then the sanctions available to the NYSE probably provide a better de-
terrent. This would be so even though members of the NYSE, unlike NASD mem-
bers, cannot be saddled with multiple penalties. In any event, because both may
discipline the individual, as well as the organization, and because both may invoke
the ultimate sanction--expulsion-there is little doubt that they can provide effec-
tive enforcement so long as membership is of economic value. No such claim can
be made for investment advisers. They belong to no organized self-regulatory
body, and it is difficult to conceive of any economic inducement which would en-
courage them to join such an organization.
109. NASD MANuAL (CCH) 1 2205.
110. Id. 2205, at 2112-13.
111. An associated person of a member may also be censured, fined, suspended
or expelled. See id. 1 2301.
112. Id.
113. See id. 1 2303.
from membership if he does not pay them promptly.1 14
Provisions of the Exchange Act dealing with the Commission's
ability to investigate alleged violations (including violations of
NASD rules) are substantially the same as those found in the Ad-
visers Act.115 Equally similar are provisions relating to the use of
public hearings, 16 and those dealing with the Commission's
power to enjoin persons who violate or who assist in the violation
of any provision of the Act, of any rule, regulation or order there-
under, or of any rule of the NASD.117 Under the Exchange Act,
though, the Commission may not bring suit against any person
for violation of the rules of the NASD unless it appears that the
NASD is unwilling or unable to take appropriate action or it ap-
pears that such action is otherwise necessary or appropriate in
the public interest or for the protection of investors.1 18 The Com-
mission may, of course, promulgate rules under the Exchange
Act' 19 as it does under the Advisers Act but the Exchange Act
mandates that it cannot adopt any rule or regulation which would
impose an unnecessary or inappropriate burden on competi-
tion.1 20
Similarly, the Commission's remedies parallel those contained
in the Advisers Act. 12 1 The Commission may censure, place limi-
tations on the activities of a broker-dealer or any associated per-
son of the broker-dealer or suspend or revoke their registration if
114. Id. $ 2302.
115. Compare Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 21, 15 U.S.C. § 78u (1976), with
Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 209, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-9 (1976). It should be noted
that, while the Commission is given discretion to publish information it has col-
lected concerning violations of the Exchange Act, it may not do so under the Ad-
visers Act unless the information is obtained in the course of a public hearing or is
requested by either house of Congress. Compare Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
§ 21(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a) (1976), with Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 212, 15
U.S.C. § 80b-12 (1976).
116. Compare Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 22, 15 U.S.C. § 78(v) (1976),
with Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 212, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-12 (1976).
117. Compare Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 21(d), (e), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d),
(e) (1976), with Investment Advisers Act, § 209(e), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-9(e) (1976).
118. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 21(f), 15 U.S.C. § 78(u)(f) (1976).
This also applies to other self-regulatory organizations, namely the exchanges.
119. Id. § 23, 15 U.S.C. § 78w (1976).
120. Id. § 23(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a)(2) (1976).
121. The SEC may cancel the registration of a broker-dealer if he is no longer
in business or has ceased to do business as a broker-dealer. A broker-dealer also
may withdraw his registration upon terms and conditions as the Commission
deems necessary or appropriate in the public interest, or for the protection of in-
vestors. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 15(b)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b) (5) (1976).
The Commission possesses these same powers under the Adviser's Act, with mi-
nor variations. An adviser's registration may be cancelled for the same reasons
even though it is still pending. However, with respect to withdrawal of registration
by an adviser, apparently, the Commission has less latitude to attach conditions
thereto: only necessary conditions may be imposed. See Investment Advisers Act
of 1940, § 203(h), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(h) (1970).
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it finds (1) such action is in the public interest and (2) the broker-
dealer or associated person has committed any of several of-
fenses. 122 It may also suspend the registration of a broker-dealer
for an interim period pending final determination as to whether
registration will actually be revoked.123 However, this sanction is
not available under the Advisers Act. The Commission may ex-
empt broker-dealers from the registration provisions of the Ex-
change Act, but, unlike its power under the Advisers Act, this
authority does not extend to other provisions of the Exchange
Act.124 Thus, while it could exempt investment advisers not only
from registration but also from the bookkeeping requirements of
Section 204, the contractual requirements of Sections 205 and 215,
and perhaps even the antifraud requirements of Section 206, it
does not have the power to free broker-dealers from similar provi-
sions contained in the Securities Exchange Act (unless such pro-
visions apply only to registered broker-dealers).
Criminal prosecutions of broker-dealers, as is the case for in-
vestment advisers, are left to the discretion of the Attorney Gen-
eral.125 Violators are subject to the same set of penalties: up to a
$10,000 fine, five years imprisonment, or both.126 The Exchange
Act explicitly states that lack of knowledge of the rule or regula-
tion allegedly violated will prevent imprisonment,127 but this de-
fense may also be embraced by the "wilful" requirement found in
the Advisers Act.128
Another difference between the two Acts concerns the general
scope of the criminal sanction. Unlike the Advisers Act, the Ex-
change Act reaches directly only persons who knowingly and
wilfully make or induce false or misleading statements in docu-
ments required to be filed with the Commission.129 Both Acts, of
course, extend to those who intentionally violate any provision of
the respective Acts, or any rule or regulation thereunder.130 So, in
122. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 15(b)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4) (1976).
The criteria are the same as when the Commission decides to deny registration.
123. Id. § 15(b)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b) (5) (1976).
124. See id. § 15(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(a) (2) (1976).
125. Id. § 21(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (1976).
126. Id. § 32(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (1976).
127. Id.
128. See Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 217, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-17 (1976).
129. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 32(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (1976).
130. Compare id. with Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 217, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-17
(1976). Interestingly, no penalties are provided for wilful violation of an order is-
sued by the SEC pursuant to the Exchange Act.
the case of investment advisers, the question is whether wilful vi-
olation of Section 207 of the Advisers Act (which deals with either
making an untrue statement or failing to state a material fact in a
registration application or a report filed under Section 204) means
that the same conduct is, in essence, made criminal under the two
Acts. If one assumes that "knowingly" adds nothing to
"wilfully"131 then this may very well be the case. 132 On the other
hand, one could argue that, because the Advisers Act was passed
six years after the Exchange Act, and because the Advisers Act
requires wilfulness but not knowledge, the Advisers Act provision
is applicable to a wider range of conduct.
The Exchange Act not only provides a means of discovering,
discouraging, and prosecuting violations, but also sees to it that a
personal action for recovery can be maintained where a broker-
dealer's carelessness, insolvency, misappropriation or embezzle-
ment causes losses to the funds or securities of the clients he ad-
vises.13 3 The vehicles providing such protection are bonding and
insurance.
Unlike investment advisers, broker-dealers generally must
maintain a blanket fidelity bond which provides insurance against
several specified types of loss.1 34 Usually, a minimum coverage of
131. This may be a difficult assumption to make. First, if knowledge is included
in willfulness, then there would have been no need to add "knowingly" to that part
of Section 32(a) of the Exchange Act which deals with misleading statements in
documents ified with the Commission. Second, it may be possible to do something
willfully without knowledge, as where the actor intended to perform an act and
did so, but was unaware that such act constituted a violation of the law. The Com-
mission, however, has recently taken the view that a person does not commit a
willful violation if he neither has knowledge of nor should have known that his
conduct amounted to a violation. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-
12389 (Apr. 29, 1976). This interpretation, of course, would mean that "knowingly"
is surplusage where a statutory provision requires willfulness.
132. Even if the conduct is made criminal under both the Advisers Act and the
Exchange Act, the Advisers Act provision does not cover such a wide range of doc-
uments. It includes only registration applications and reports filed under section
204 of the Advisers Act. Compare Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 32(a), 15
U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (1976), with Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 207, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-
7 (1976).
133. See SEC Proposals, supra note 1, at E-5.
134. NASD MANUAL (CCH) 1 2182; 17 C.F.R. § 240.15b10-11 (1977). Broker-deal-
ers who are not required to become members of the Securities Investor Protection
Corporation are not required to be bonded. Id. However, broker-dealers who are
members of the NYSE must be bonded. NASD and SECO broker-dealers, who are
required to be bonded, may have deductibles included in their bonds of up to 10
percent of the minimum insurance requirement. NASD MANUAL (CCH) 2182; 17
C.F.R. § 240.15b10-11 (1977). The blanket bond must also include minimum cover-
age of $100,000 for the following offenses: misplacement, fraudulent trading, check
forgery, and securities forgery. 2 N.Y.S.E. GUIDE (CCH) 1 2319.11. The $100,000
minimum for fraudulent trading is not required of individual members of the
NYSE or of partnerships that have no employees. Id.
These obligations generally parallel those applicable to NASD and SECO bro-
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$25,000 must be carried for each category, with the amount in-
creasing in relation to the amount of net capital required under
Rule 15c3-1.135 Cash and securities in the custody of a broker-
dealer are insured to $20,000 and $50,000 respectively.136 As in
previously discussed areas, the SEC has acknowledged the dis-
crepancy between advisory and broker-dealer requirements, and
has asked for authority to establish bonding standards for invest-
ment advisers.137
3. Banks vs. Broker-dealers and Investment Advisers
Banks provide both personal advisory and personal trust serv-
ices. Personal advisory services-which can be directly compared
to the particularized investment advice rendered by investment
advisers and broker-dealers-are offered by a bank trust depart-
ment or by the investment advisory subsidiary of a bank holding
company. With respect to advising individuals, it should be men-
tioned that the only federal law specifically applicable to such a
subsidiary states that it "shall observe the standards of care and
conduct applicable to fiduciaries."l3 On the other hand, such sub-
ker-dealers. It is not surprising, then, that compliance with the bonding require-
ments of the NYSE ordinarily satisfies the bonding provisions for SECO broker-
dealers. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15b10-11(a) (1977). This is probably the case because cov-
erage under the NYSE equals or exceeds the SECO or NASD coverage. This is
especially true with regard to the basic required coverage. The NYSE specifies at
least $100,000 in every instance, while the SECO and NASD provisions begin at
only $25,000. Compare 2 N.Y.S.E. GUIDE (CCH) 2319 with NASD MANUAL (CCH)
2182 and 17 C.F.R. § 240.15b10-11 (1977).
The only area in which the NYSE provisions are arguably weaker than the
NASD or SECO provisions relates to insurance against loss which stems from
fidelity, on premises, or in transit occurrences. These three events are explicitly
provided for under the NASD/SECO rules. However, since the blanket bond spec-
ified in the NYSE provisions covers these situations, this is more a difference in
form than in substance. For the reasons discussed above, investment advisers and
broker-dealers who perform the same narrow function ought to be subject to
bonding requirements more in accord with the basic coverages provided under the
NASD or SECO rules.
135. See note 134, supra.
136. Note, The Legality of Bank-Sponsored Investment Services, 84 YALE L.J.
1477, 1499 & n.141 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Yale Note].
137. See SEC Proposals, supra note 1, at E-5.
138. 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(a) (5) (iii) n.2 (1977). The penalty for a company that vio-
lates this standard is a $1,000 fine for each day the violation continues. See 12
U.S.C § 1847 (1976). Since § 1847 does not refer to violations of regulations issued
by the board when spelling out the penalties for individuals, it appears that there
may be no recourse under federal law against individuals who breach their fiduci-
ary duties but who are not guilty of criminal offenses.
Bank holding companies have also registered investment advisory subsidiaries
sidiaries must register under the Advisers Act and are subject to
the full range of that Act's provisions.
To a certain extent, the same statement can be made with re-
gard to bank trust operations as there are no specific federal
fiduciary provisions applicable to the trust operation of a state
bank which is a member of the Federal Reserve System,139 or to a
which manage individual funds under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940. See
Investment Advisers Act of 1940, §§ 202(a)(11)(A), 203, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-
2(a)(11)(A), 80b-3 (1976), and SEC, SMALL AccouNT INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT
SERVICES 8 (1973).
The Federal Reserve Board may require the holding company and its subsidiar-
ies to provide it with reports from time to time or to undergo examinations. How-
ever, to the extent possible the Board is under an obligation to use the reports of
examinations made by the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Deposit In-
surance Corporation (FDIC) or the appropriate state bank supervisory authority.
Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, § 5(c), 12 U.S.C. § 1844(c) (1976). An officer,
director, agent or employee of the holding company who makes a false entry in
any book or report with intent to deceive the Comptroller, the FDIC, the Federal
Reserve Board, or an examiner appointed to examine the affairs of the holding
company, may be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned for not more than five
years, or both. Id. § 8, 12 U.S.C. § 1847, 18 U.S.C. § 1005 (1976).
139. Prior to September 1, 1948, all state banks exercising trust powers that
were members of the Federal Reserve System were subject to certain restrictions
provided for in section 6(b) of former Regulation H. 3 FED. BANKING L. REP.
(CCH) 35,301 at 17,180 (1968). These restrictions, not unlike those contained in
the current Regulation 9, pertained to self-dealing, collective investment of funds,
segregation of investments, and security for deposit of trust funds placed in the
bank's commercial or savings department or otherwise used in the conduct of its
business. Id. These requirements were repealed, but this does not mean the Fed-
eral Reserve Board altered its position regarding the undesirability of practices
that were previously prohibited. Id. In fact, failure on the part of state member
banks to conduct their trust business in accordance with applicable state laws and
sound principles of trust administration may violate section 208.7(a) (1) of current
Regulation H. Id. Section 208.7(a) (1) reads:
[A] bank at all times shall conduct its business and exercise its powers
with due regard to the safety of its depositors and shall not cause or per-
mit any change to be made in the general character of its business or in
the scope of the corporate powers exercised by it at the time of admission
to membership.
Id. 30,961, at 14,454; 12 C.F.R. § 208.7(a)(1) (1978).
A similar regulation has been promulgated by the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, the body which oversees the trust activities of insured state banks
who are not members of the Federal Reserve System. It provides that these non-
member banks are under a duty to conduct their operations in a "safe and sound
manner", and that the Corporation retains "authority to deal with any banking
practice which is deemed to be unsafe or unsound". 12 C.F.R. § 337.11 (1978).
State member banks must still obtain permission from the Federal Reserve Board
before they may open a trust department. See 2 FED. BANKING L REP. (CCH) 1
35,301, at 17,181. Similarly, state nonmember insured banks that contemplate es-
tablishing a trust department must also get prior written consent from the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 333.1, 333.2 (1978).
State member banks may, however, act as trustees of Individual Retirement Ac-
counts (established pursuant to ERISA) and self-employed retirement plans (H.R.
10 trusts) without prior approval of the Federal Reserve Board if these funds are
invested in a savings account or time deposit of the bank and if such an arrange-
ment is not contrary to state law. [1973-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. BANKING L.
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state nonmenber bank which is insured by the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC),140 or to a trust subsidiary of a
bank holding company organized pursuant to state law.141 Only
the trust department of a national bank - whether or not such
bank is part of a bank holding company142 - is subject to a set of
specific provisions dealing with investment counseling. These
provisions are embodied in Regulation 9 promulgated by the
Comptroller of the Currency. 43 This regulation will be consid-
ered below, along with other rules that affect the activities of na-
tional banks as providers of investment advice.
Regulating Competence
Like broker-dealers, national banks wishing to furnish invest-
ment advice to individuals in the form of personal trust services
are subject to both financial and qualifications standards. Finan-
cial standards are imposed, in part, by virtue of the fact that a
bank must satisfy certain conditions precedent to commencing
business as a national bank. Among these conditions precedent
REP. (CCH) 1 96.564. National banks and federal savings and loan associations
may also act as trustees for these accounts without prior approval of their respec-
tive regulatory agencies if similar conditions are observed. Id. 96,445; 3 id.
40,404, at 19,509-2. Federal savings and loan associations, but not national banks
(unless these banks have a trust permit), may commingle these funds for "appro-
priate purposes of investment," although detailed individual records of transac-
tions must be kept. Id.
140. The author could find only one regulation issued by the FDIC dealing with
the trust powers of state nonmenber insured banks. The regulation disclaims any
express or implied approval by the FDIC of the legality of commingling "general
trust accounts." 12 C.F.R. § 331.1 (1978).
141. Regulation Y permits a bank holding company to control a trust subsidiary
that does not engage in commercial banking. See 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(a) (4), (5)
(1978). Thus, where a state requires a trust company to make loans or accept de-
posits, it appears that a trust subsidiary cannot be established pursuant to the law
of such state. This dilemma may be avoided by organizing a trust company sub-
sidiary under federal law. In recent years the Comptroller of the Currency has
granted four national bank charters to banking concerns offering trust services
only. Wall Street Journal, Nov. 3, 1975, at 4, col. 2. Such concerns cannot insure
their trust funds with the FDIC. See note 166 infra. In any event, in the case of a
trust subsidiary established by a bank holding company, Regulation Y does not
even provide a general standard as it does for the investment advisory subsidiary
that advises individuals. Compare 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(a) (4) (1978) with id. §
225.4(a) (5) n.2.
142. Prior approval of the Federal Reserve Board is needed for any action that
causes a bank to become a subsidiary of a bank holding company. 12 U.S.C. § 1842
(1976).
143. 12 C.F.R. § 9 (1978). Paragraph 9.18 will not be considered since it deals
exclusively with the management of pooled funds.
is the requirement that each national bank have an average capi-
tal of at least $100,000 per office. Also, there is a requirement that
paid-in surplus equal 20 percent of such capital.l" By contrast,
broker-dealers need only raise $25,000 of net capital before engag-
ing in a brokerage business which, inter alia, renders investment
advice to customers based upon the individual needs and objec-
tives of such customers. Investment advisers are currently sub-
ject to no net capital requirements whatsoever.
Financial and qualifications standards also come into play when
the Comptroller considers whether or not to grant a national bank
a permit to engage in fiduciary activities.145 Such a permit can be
granted if doing so would not contravene the state law where the
national bank is located, and if competing state institutions are
also permitted to act as fiduciaries. 4 6 Similarly, if the applicable
local law requires corporate fiduciaries to deposit securities with
state authorities for the protection of trusts, then a national bank
must make a similar deposit before exercising any fiduciary pow-
ers.147
It seems clear that, vis-a-vis investment advisers and broker-
dealers, national banks are subject to the strictest financial re-
quirements. Thus, the client of a bank which provides such client
with investment advice has comparatively greater security in
knowing that the bank must raise considerably more capital to
prove its sincerity in engaging in the banking business. This
means that the client has somewhat more assurance that, if he
elects to do so, he can consult with the bank concerning invest-
ment questions on an on-going basis.
Such an unequivocal observation cannot, however, be made re-
garding other qualifications standards. Broker-dealers are gov-
erned by specific qualifications criteria, whereas bank personnel
144. 12 U.S.C. § 51 (1976).
145. 12 C.F.R. § 9.3 (1978). The factors:
(1) whether the bank has sufficient capital and surplus, which cannot be
less than that required by state law of state banks;
(2) the needs of the community for fiduciary services and the probable
volume of such fiduciary business;
(3) the general condition of the bank, including the adequacy of its capi-
tal and surplus in relation to its assets, its deposit liabilities, and its
corporate responsibilities;
(4) the general character and ability of management;
(5) the nature of the supervision to be given to fiduciary activities, in-
cluding the qualifications, experience, and character of the proposed
officers of the trust department,
(6) whether legal counsel is available to advise on fiduciary matters.
Id. In actuality, a national bank desiring to operate a trust department must have
legal counsel readily available to pass upon fiduciary matters. See 12 C.F.R. §
9.7(c) (1978).
146. 12 U.S.C. § 92a(a) (1976).
147. 12 U.S.C. § 92a(f) (1976); see 12 C.F.R. § 9.14 (1978).
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competence is a question left to the Comptroller's discretion. The
Comptroller is required to assess the "ability of management"
and the "nature of the supervision to be given to fiduciary activi-
ties, including the qualifications, experience, and character of the
proposed officers of the trust department."1 8 Note that he is not
required to consider the qualifications of persons other than of-
ficers. For this reason one could conclude that employees and of-
ficers of broker-dealers are subject to more rigorous qualifications
standards than bank personnel (since employees of broker-deal-
ers are not exempted). However, without actually surveying the
qualifications of trust department personnel, it is impossible to
reach any firm conclusion.
Regulating Integrity
Federal banking law does not regulate the integrity of national
bank trust departments per se, other than to provide that funds
held in a fiduciary capacity "shall be invested in accordance with
the instrument establishing the fiduciary relationship and local
law."149 This means, of course, that the contract between adviser
and client, in conjunction with state law, creates the applicable
standard.
What federal banking law does regulate is the potential for con-
flict of interest or self-dealing which arises in connection with the
management of trust accounts. Thus, ordinarily, funds held in a
fiduciary capacity by a national bank cannot be invested in the
stock or bonds of the bank, its directors, officers, employees or
anyone else connected with the bank, and cannot be sold or trans-
ferred to or used to acquire property from same, if the bank has
any interest in such person or organization which "might affect
the exercise of the best judgment of the bank . .15o If such
148. See note 145 supra.
149. 12 C.F.R. § 9.11 (1978). If the trust department does not have discretionary
investment authority over an account and the governing instrument does not indi-
cate the type of investments to be made, funds are to be placed in any investment
which corporate fiduciaries may invest in under local law. See id. § 9.11(a) (1978).
150. 12 C.F.R. § 9.12(a), (b) (1978). Funds may be so invested, sold or trans-
ferred by the bank if the governing instrument, a court order, or local law lawfully
authorizes it to do so. Id. Where the bank is permitted to purchase its own stock
or obligations or the stock or obligations of its affiliates for fiduciary accounts it
enjoys other specified rights. See id. § 9.12(c). Similarly, funds may be sold or
transferred from fiduciary accounts to the bank or to persons affiliated with the
bank if required by the Comptroller, or in certain other limited circumstances. See
id. § 9.12(b).
funds are lent to any officer, director, or employee of the bank,
such person-as well as the person who made the loan-may be
fined up to $5,000, imprisoned up to five years, or both.151 How-
ever, a national bank may make a loan to an account and take the
assets of such account as security if the transaction is fair and not
unlawful under local law.'5 2 Transactions between accounts are
also permitted if certain conditions are satisfied.
5 3
Although neither the Investment Advisers Act nor the Securi-
ties Exchange Act has specific provisions regulating such forms of
self-dealing, the antifraud provisions of the two Acts might very
well be construed to prohibit the same sort of practices. Simi-
larly, state law (especially state securities law fashioned after the
federal securities laws) may in fact outlaw dealings which
amount to fraud under the Advisers Act and Exchange Act. The
net result is that it is difficult to conclude whether the integrity of
banks is more closely regulated than the integrity of broker-deal-
ers and investment advisers, or vice versa.
Enforcement Mechanisms
The Comptroller of the Currency is vested with virtually exclu-
sive responsibility for enforcing the laws, rules, regulations or or-
ders governing the trust operations of national banks. Although a
private cause of action has been found under the Comptroller's
Regulation 16.4,154 the only court to consider the same question
under Regulation 9 found the remedies enumerated therein to be
exclusive. 155 This holding apparently means that private damage
suits can be brought only against directors of a national bank who
knowingly violate or knowingly permit any of the bank's officers
or employees to violate applicable federal banking laws. 5 6 Unlike
suits against broker-dealers (and perhaps investment advisers)
151. 12 U.S.C. § 92a(h) (1976).
152. 12 C.F.R. § 9.12(f) (1978).
153. See id. § 9.12(d), (e). The assets of one fiduciary account may be sold to
another fiduciary account if the transaction is fair to both accounts and is not pro-
hibited by the governing instrument or local law. Id. § 9.12(d). The assets of one
fiduciary account may be lent to another such account if the instrument creating
the mortgagee account authorizes such loan and such loan is not prohibited by lo-
cal law. See id. § 9.12(e).
154. Little v. First Calif. Co., Civil No. 74-71 (D. Ariz. July 11, 1974), [1973-1978
Transfer Binder] FED. BANKING L. REP. (CCH) 96,305.
155. Blaney v. Florida Nat'l Bank, 357 F.2d 27, 30 (5th Cir. 1966). This case was
brought under the predecessor of Regulation 9 (Regulation F of the Federal Re-
serve System), but the court indicated its analysis would be the same pursuant to
Regulation 9. See id.
156. The court in Blaney specifically noted that it was not addressing the ques-
tion of whether a private suit could be brought against the directors. Id. Such a
suit should be actionable under either 12 U.S.C. § 93 (1976) (violations of 12 U.S.C.
§§ 92a, 161(a)) or 12 U.S.C. § 503 (1976) (violation of 12 U.S.C. § 481).
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direct actions by private parties against such officers or employ-
ees would not be entertained in court, except where a violation of
Section 10b of the Securities Exchange Act (and Rule lOb-5 there-
under) can be demonstrated.
The Comptroller possesses enforcement authority equivalent to
the SEC's power under the Securities Exchange Act or the In-
vestment Advisers Act. National banks are subject to an elabo-
rate monitoring scheme, the purpose of which is to ensure
financial soundness of the bank rather than to protect the inves-
tor. This scheme provides for detailed supervision of accounts, 157
periodic audits158 and financial reports,159 and restrictions on the
157. The board of directors of the bank is responsible for the proper exercise of
fiduciary powers, but it may designate officers, directors, or employees of the bank
to administer these powers. 12 C.F.R. § 9.7(a) (1) (1978). It is incumbent on such
person or persons to approve in writing the opening of fiduciary accounts, and a
record must be kept of all openings and closings of fiduciary accounts. Id. §
9.7(a) (2). A record must also be kept of each fiduciary account itself as well as of
all pending litigation involving these accounts in which the bank is a party. Id. §
9.8. Fiduciary records are required to be kept "separate and distinct" from other
bank records for such time as to permit the bank to provide information to the
Comptroller. 12 C.F.R. § 9.8(a) (1978). Separation of trust assets from the other
assets of the bank-without segregation of assets in individual accounts-is suffi-
cient. Am. Legion Post No. 90 v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 113 F.2d 868 (2d Cir.
1940).
Fiduciary records must be reivewed by both the bank and outside parties, and
reports must be filed with the Comptroller. When an account is opened for which
the bank has "investment responsibilities", a prompt review of the assets therein
is conducted. 12 C.F.R. § 9.7(a) (2) (1978). "Investment responsibilities" presuma-
bly includes discretionary management authority as well as a more limited discre-
tion to invest within designated classes of investments. Thereafter, the board of
directors must ensure that a similar review shall be made once every 15 months to
determine the advisability of retaining or disposing of the assets. Id.
158. Every 15 months a suitable audit must be made to ascertain whether the
trust department has been operated in accordance with law, Regulation 9, and
"sound fiduciary principles". Id. § 9.9. A continuous audit system may be adopted
in lieu of such periodic audits. In any case, the auditors must be answerable only
to a committee of directors which excludes any active officers of the bank. Id. The
same determination is made by the Comptroller in connection with the general ex-
amination of national banks conducted at least three times every two years. See
id. § 9.11(d); 12 U.S.C. § 481 (1976). Banks that are members of the Federal Re-
serve System (including national banks) also are subject to special examinations
by the Federal Reserve Bank located within their district. 12 U.S.C. § 483 (1976).
Refusal to allow such an examiniation may result in forfeiture of all rights of the
bank in the Federal Reserve System. 12 U.S.C. §§ 481, 501a (1976). The examiners
who perform these examinations prepare a detailed report of the bank's condition,
and such report may be published by the Comptroller in proper circumstances.
Id. § 481.
159. A national bank insured by the FDIC must file four reports of condition
each year with the Comptroller, and the amount of trust funds held in the trust
department must be stated separately in these reports. 12 U.S.C. §§ 222,
handling of investments held in fiduciary accounts. 160
1817(a) (3), (4), (1976) (if a national bank is located in any state of the Union it
must be a member of the Federal Reserve System and must be insured by the
FDIC. 12 U.S.C. § 222 (1976)). For each day a bank delays in submitting such re-
ports it may be fined $100. Id. § 164. Insured national banks must, in addition, file
certified statements semiannually showing their average assessment base and the
amount of assessment due to the FDIC. Id. § 1817(c). If a bank continues to with-
hold either of these two types of reports from the appropriate regulatory agency, it
may forfeit all its rights under the National Bank Act and the Federal Reserve Act,
and may be sued by the FDIC. Id. § 1817(f), (g), (h).
Unless an exemption is granted upon request, 12 C.F.R. § 9.103(c) (1978), trust
departments which have $75 million or more in equity securities are further re-
quired to file annual reports with the Comptroller which provide various details of
such holdings. Id. §§ 9.101, 9.102(a). The details include the name of the issuer,
the title and class, the number of shares and the aggregate fair market value of
each security held in accounts for which the bank acts as trustee, executor, admin-
istrator or guardian, whether or not the bank has investment authority either
alone or with someone else (sole investment authority, shared investment author-
ity, or no investment authority), the amount of equity securities within each cate-
gory and the total number of shares of each such security for which the bank
enjoys the exclusive voting rights. See id. However, any equity security, the ag-
gregate holding of which does not exceed 10,000 shares, and the assets of any reg-
istered investment company which the bank advises, need not be included in the
annual report. Id. § 9.103(a), (b).
The Comptroller has indicated that this would require reports from 197 of the
approximately 2,000 national banks that exercise trust powers, but the covered
banks would account for more than 90 percent of the holdings of all national bank
trust departments. 39 F.R. 28144 (1974). A trust department is also under an obli-
gation to report quarterly on trades of equity securities valued at $500,000 or more,
or involving ten thousand or more shares, for any fiduciary account over which it
has investment discretion. 12 C.F.R. § 9.102(b) (1978). Both this report and the an-
nual report required to be fied must be made available for public inspection, ex-
cept where any portions thereof are designated as confidential by the Comptroller.
See id. §§ 9.101, 9.102(d). Even these portions, however, must be made available to
the public after a reasonable period of time. See id. § 9.101. Finally, as for invest-
ment advisers and broker-dealers, national banks are required to disclose their
commission practices and holding of equity securities. See note 35 supra.
160. Inasmuch as fiduciary records must be segregated from other records, sim-
ilarly, the investments of each account must be kept separate from the assets of
the bank and from all other accounts. 12 C.F.R. § 9.13(a), (b)(1) (1978). (Alterna-
tively, individual accounts may be adequately identified as the property of the rel-
evant account. Id. § 9.13(b) (1), (2)). Such investments are required to be placed
in the joint custody or control of at least two officers or employees of the bank. Id.
§ 9.13(a). These officers or employees must be designated by the board of direc-
tors or by one or more officers who have been designated by the board of direc-
tors. See id.
If permitted by the governing instrument and local law, investments may be de-
posited in the commercial department of the bank-provided that adequate collat-
eral is set aside under control of the trust department. Id. § 9.10(b). The collateral
must generally be in the form of readily marketable securities, and must be equal
in amount to the amount of trust funds deposited. However, to the extent that the
funds so deposited are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation no
collateral is required. Id. Currently, funds are insured up to $40,000. The result is
that in many instances no collateral need be set aside. If for some reason the
bank wishes to deposit the investments of a fiduciary account outside the bank it
may do so if permitted by law. Id. § 9.13(a). At the same time, funds held in a
fiduciary capacity awaiting investment must be carried in a separate account and
may not be used by the bank in the conduct of its business unless U.S. bonds or
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The Comptroller may investigate violations, and may seek to
employ a variety of remedies. If he believes that the trust depart-
ment of a national bank is engaging in or is about to engage in a
violation of any relevant provisions or in an unsound practice, he
may initiate proceedings to obtain a cease-and-desist order.
161
Where such violation or practice is likely to cause substantial dis-
sipation of the bank's earnings or assets, or is likely to otherwise
seriously prejudice the interests of depositors, a temporary cease-
and-desist order may be issued ex parte. 162 If such violation or
practice is not corrected after notice thereof is given to the bank,
the bank's insured status may be terminated. 163 The Comptroller
may also proceed against directors, officers, and other individuals
participating in the conduct of the trust department. Such per-
sons may be suspended from office or prohibited from further
participation in the bank's business for commission of any of sev-
eral designated offenses.164 These powers are analogous to the
SEC's power to enjoin violations of the Securities Exchange Act
and Investment Advisers Act and to suspend or revoke the regis-
tration of persons registered under said Acts.
As was the case for broker-dealers, the advisory clients of na-
tional bank trust departments are provided with a "fund" for re-
covery of losses caused by such departments. All officers and
employees engaged in the trust operation of a national bank, in-
cluding the officers or employees who have joint custody or con-
trol of the investments in each fiduciary account, must be
other securities approved by the Comptroller are set aside in the trust depart-
ment. 12 U.S.C § 92a(d) (1976). If the bank fails, the owners of the funds held in
trust for investment will have a lien on these bonds or securities in addition to
their claim against the estate of the bank. Id. § 92a(e). Funds held in trust by the
bank either awaiting investment or distribution may not remain uninvested or un-
distributed longer than is reasonable under the circumstances. See 12 C.F.R. §
9.10(a) (1978). In the absence of an agreement or of any applicable local law, the
bank may charge a reasonable fee for the fiduciary services it provides. Id. §
9.15(a). None of the officers or employees of a national bank without specific ap-
proval of the board of directors, may receive any compensation for acting as co-
fiduciary of an account with the bank. Id. § 9.15(b).
161. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(1) (1976).
162. See id. § 181(c).
163. Id. § 181(a).
164. See id. § 181(e) (2), (4), (6)-(8), (g). Persons who are so suspended or pro-
hibited, or who have received notice of such an intention, may be fined up to
$5,000, or imprisoned up to one year, or both, if they participate further in the
bank's affairs. Id. § 181(j).
adequately bonded.165 However, unlike comparable provisions
pertaining to broker-dealers, Regulation 9 neither specifies partic-
ular bond amounts nor minimum coverage. Except where the
bank is not engaged in receiving deposits (i.e., a trust company),
trust funds placed in fiduciary accounts must be insured to $40,000
by the FDIC (twice the amount applicable to broker-dealers).166
Banks are not required to insure customer securities in any
amount.1 67 Investment advisers, it will be recalled, are subject to
neither bonding nor insurance requirements.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Those who provide investment advice-investment advisers,
broker-dealers, and banks-are subject to varying regulatory bur-
dens. Generally, broker-dealers are governed by the most rigor-
ous scheme. In many respects national banks are subject to
standards comparable to those applicable to broker-dealers,
though such standards are usually left to be defined by the Comp-
troller of the Currency. Investment advisers, on the other hand,
are subject to a regulatory scheme much less demanding than
that applicable to banks or broker-dealers.
Since these three groups perform a common function, uniform
regulation seems clearly appropriate. The reason for this is sim-
ple: competing institutions should be placed on the same regula-
tory footing so that any competitive advantages accruing to one
type of institution flow from such institution's ability to serve its
'customers, not from idiosyncratic regulation. The difficulty lies in
establishing the appropriate level of regulation.
The approach adopted by the recommendations that follow is,
generally, to model the regulation of banks and investment advis-
ers a fter the rules governing broker-dealers registered under the
Securities Exchange Act. Standardization of regulation is not
-based upon the regulation of investment advisers because, in cer-
tain' 'areas, it affords inadequate protection for investors: a dubi-
ous right to bring private lawsuits, no financial or qualifications
standards, and no bonding or insurance requirements. The regu-
lation of national bank trust departments is not followed, prima-
165. 12 C.F.R. §§ 9.7(b), 9.13(a) (1978).
166. Although all trust funds held in a fiduciary capacity by an insured bank
must be insured to $40,000, a bank which does not receive deposits other than trust
funds will have its insured status terminated. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1817(i), 1818(p) (1976).
Thus, a trust company is not permitted to have its trust funds insured by the
FDIC. The $40,000 in insurance is in addition to the insurance covering other de-
posits of the owners of the trust funds or the beneficiaries of such trust funds. Id.
§ 1817(i).
167. This conclusion is based upon the author's examination of the banking
laws.
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rily because the author prefers a regulatory scheme which sets
forth explicit norms.
1. Investment Advisers
Standardization of regulation at a point which provides a rea-
sonable degree of investor protection will have its most dramatic
effect on investment advisers. With regard to the need for general
training and qualifications standards, disclosure of an adviser's
background might ordinarily be sufficient to inform the investor
of the adviser's competence to render investment advice. How-
ever, since the general level of expertise in the industry is appar-
ently inadequate, 168 satisfaction of formal standards ought to be
mandatory. As is the case with broker-dealers, this should be im-
plemented by administering a written examination which tests
the knowledge necessary to advise clients on the merits of invest-
ments.
A minimum age standard is also of concern. Clearly, the Com-
mission is disturbed by the fact that there is currently no barrier
preventing minors from registering as investment advisers. 169
The lack of a minimum age requirement probably undermines
public confidence in investment advisers, since it permits imma-
ture (and hence incompetent) individuals to render investment
advise. Moreover, as the Commission has pointed out,170 under-
age individuals who serve as investment advisers may elect to
disaffirm contracts with customers under state law. This could
create disastrous consequences for clients if there were no bond-
ing requirements and if private parties were denied the right to
sue for damages under the Advisers Act (both of which may be
the case at present). Under these circumstances a customer
would be left with two alternatives if the adviser should cease to
do business or abscond with prepaid fees: quasi-contractual re-
covery under state law or a federal action pursuant to Section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 there-
under. To recover under the latter, intent or scienter would have
to be shown and the client would have to be a purchaser or seller
of securities. In either case, the lack of any bonding requirements
168. The Special Study suggested that the lack of qualification standards pro-
duces substandard personnel in the entire industry. See Special Study, supra
note 5, at 146-48, 158-59; Michigan Comment, supra note 48, at 1224 n.25.
169. See Wall Street Journal, Feb. 19, 1976, at 36, col. 1.
170. SEC Proposals, supra note 1, at E-4.
may leave the customer remediless if there are little or no assets
out of which to satisfy a judgment.
Thus, the question whether minimum age requirements should
be imposed not only involves consideration of the competence of
the adviser, but also requires an examination of the remedies
available to the customer. Interestingly enough, in the case of
broker-dealers (who are subject to both bonding requirements
and private suits) the SEC does not have explicit authority to es-
tablish minimum age requirements (except by refusing to vali-
date a rule of a self-regulatory organization1 7 1 which sets an age
requirement that the Commission regards as too low).
Investment advisers also should be subject to financial respon-
sibility requirements. The SEC has recognized as much, asking
for the authority from Congress to promulgate such standards.172
The Commission has sought this authority instead of directly
resorting to the net capital concept governing broker-dealers be-
cause, apparently, it believes financial responsibility standards
serve different purposes as between investment advisers and bro-
ker-dealers:
A primary objective of any financial responsibility rule under the Advisers
Act would be the existence of the investment adviser as a going concern
to provide the requisite continuity to long-range investment planning. In
contrast, the primary concern in the broker-dealer industry, where the
mere execution of transactions does not necessarily involve a continuing
relationship, is the safeguarding of monetary and proprietary obligations
to customers which an unhealthy level of indebtedness might endan-
ger.
1 73
However, this observation is not entirely correct. First, the im-
portance of a subscription adviser as a going concern would ap-
pear to be much less than for an adviser providing particularized
advice to individual customers. In the former case, the client is
responsible for investment decisions, relying on the adviser
mainly as a source of investment information. Of course, if the
adviser ceases to do business, the client might lose subscription
fees paid in advance. His investment plan (if he had one) would
possibly be disrupted, but, more than likely, he could switch to
another adviser (or place greater reliance on general financial
publications) without any detrimental effect. Second, because
broker-dealers not only execute trades but also provide advice on
an on-going basis, there is often-times a continuing relationship
between the broker-dealer and his client. Thus, it would seem ap-
propriate to apply the net capital concept to investment advisers,
171. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 19(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(c) (1976).
172. SEC Proposals, supra note 1, at E-5.
173. Id.
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but to distinguish between the two types of advisers when formu-
lating net capital criteria.
If the standards of financial responsibility applicable to broker-
dealers are applied to investment advisers who perform similar
functions, subscription advisers should be held to a standard not
unlike that for broker-dealers who do not carry customer ac-
counts or handle customer funds or securities. This would em-
body the $5,000 in net capital and the fifteen to one (eight to one
in the first year) debt/capital ratio referred to previously. Simi-
larly, investment advisers who render particularized advice to
their customers should be required to raise $25,000 of net capital.
Unless an adviser invests a substantial amount of capital into
his business, he should be covered by a basic bond which, in ap-
propriate circumstances, will adequately compensate customers
for (1) loss of profits where the adviser "trades on a recommenda-
tion,"174 (2) damages caused by the adviser's issuance of inten-
tionally false information, (3) loss of prepaid fees where the
adviser misappropriates them or goes out of business, and (4)
loss of funds and securities held in the custody of the adviser. In
the case of a subscription adviser (who does not have custody of
funds or securities) the bond should be equal to the value of fees
held by the adviser plus an additional amount. One author has
suggested that $15,000 would be sufficient in this circumstance,
but this figure apparently does not include coverage of prepaid
fees.175 For the adviser who handles client funds and securities a
basic bond of at least $25,000 should be required.
Using the Exchange Act as a model for revamping the regula-
tion of investment advisers would result in various other changes
as well. The "intrastate" and client-based exemptions found in
the Advisers Act would be eliminated,176 consistent with the re-
174. Cf. Note, The Regulation of Investment Advisers, 14 STAN. L. REV. 827, 838-
42 (1962). This situation arises where, in reliance on the adviser's recommenda-
tion, subscribers either buy or sell the recommended security. This action may
lead to an artificially high or low market price if the recommendation was issued
merely to enable the adviser to take advantage of the ensuing short-term price
swing. The price of the security will then return to its "real" level, with subscrib-
ers suffering a loss equal to the difference in prices multiplied by the number of
shares traded.
175. Id. 842.
176. It should be mentioned that broker-dealers whose business is exclusively
intrastate are also exempted from registration under the Exchange Act. Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934, § 15(a) (1), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(a) (1) (1976). But this exemp-
tion has a much narrower scope than does the intrastate exemption found in the
cent trend whereby federal domain over the securities markets
has increased. 177 This would provide investors residing in states
which do not regulate investment advisers with at least some pro-
tection. Private plaintiffs would be afforded the right to sue under
the Advisers Act, and, restrictions would be placed upon the form
in which certain written recommendations are made.' 78 Finally,
the Commission would be granted interim suspension power over
investment advisers, 79 the criminal sanction would be amended
to conform to the comparable Exchange Act provisions,180 and the
Commission would be required to consider the effect on competi-
tion when it promulgates rules under the Advisers Act.181
Advisers Act. Compare id. with notes 62-64 and accompanying text supra. Elimi-
nation of the intrastate exemption found in the Advisers Act would bring said Act
into conformity with the Securities Exchange Act, since there is probably no con-
stitutional authority for federal regulation of activities which have an exclusively
intrastate character.
177. See SEC Proposals, supra note 1, at E-7 & n.20. Also, the Securities Acts
Amendments of 1975 amended section 3(a) (17) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 so that broker-dealers who trade exclusively on a national securities ex-
change are now under the domain of the Exchange Act.
178. Unlike the standards applicable to NASD and NYSE broker-dealers, in-
vestment advisers (and SECO broker-dealers as well) are not subject to any spe-
cific guidelines when they present current recommendations in newsletters. See
note 104 and accompanying text supra. The Commission has articulated some
standards in this area on an ad hoc basis but these have not proved adequate.
Michigan Comment, supra note 48, at 1236. If investment advisers are subjected to
the same guidelines as broker-dealers when they recommend securities they
would be required to disclose such items as the price when the original recom-
mendation was made, whether the adviser intends to buy or sell recommended se-
curities for his own account or owns rights to purchase the recommended
securities, the name of the party who prepared the recommendation if other than
the adviser himself, the date the material was first published, and if not current, a
statement to this effect. Investment advisers would also te prohibited from claim-
ing research capability they do not possess, from making exaggerated claims or
promises of specific results, and from issuing forecasts of future events unless
they are clearly labeled as such. Also, before a newsletter is distributed by a bro-
ker-dealer it must be approved in writing by a supervisor. See NASD MmUAL
(CCH) 2177, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15b10-4(c)(3) (1978). If the broker-dealer is a mem-
ber of the NYSE and if the newsletter is a detailed analysis of a single company or
industry, the supervisor who gives approval must qualify as an "Exchange Super-
visory Analyst". See note 66 supra. Although investment advisers are under an
obligation to establish and enforce reasonable supervisory procedures, there is no
explicit requirement that the market letters they issue be approved in writing
before release.
Broker-dealers, as well as subscription advisers, should also be prohibited from
circulating newsletters first to favored institutional clients and then to ordinary
customers. See Special Study, supra note 5, at 373-74. An argument can be made
that broker-dealer members of the NASD who follow such practice and who
charge a uniform fee for receipt of the newsletter are in violation of a provision of
the NASD rules which prohibit making unfair discriminatory charges between
customers. See NASD MAmuAL (CCH) 2153.
179. See text accompanying note 123 supra.
180. See text accompanying notes 127-31 supra.
181. See text accompanying note 120 supra.
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2. Broker-dealers
Except for provisions pertaining to the investment advisory
contract between adviser and client, the Securities Exchange Act
regulates investment advising activities of registered broker-deal-
ers in a more stringent manner than the Investment Advisers Act
regulates the activities of investment advisers.18 2 The Exchange
Act contains essentially all of the basic ingredients to provide for
an advisory industry composed of individuals competent to fur-
nish on-going advice on an impartial basis, who can be held ac-
countable for monetary losses for which they are responsible.
Thus, broker-dealers who are registered under the Exchange Act
and who comply with Section 205 of the Advisers Act (dealing
with the investment advisory contract) should be permanently
exempted from registering under the Advisers Act.
Broker-dealers, however, occupy a unique position in that they
are providers of investment advice who are also in a position to
execute the relevant securities transactions. In order to reduce
the incentive for broker-dealers to trade discretionary accounts
excessively - and thereby generate increased commissions -
consideration should be given to prohibiting such indirect charges
for these accounts. Unfortunately even with a direct levy, broker-
dealers who are in a position to execute transactions for discre-
tionary accounts may be inclined to encourage unnecessary
trades. Congress addressed a related problem in the Securities
Acts Amendments of 1975, forbidding discretionary authority for
certain types of accounts.18 3 Individual accounts were not among
these. However, the SEC was given authority, inter alia, to pre-
182. Compare text accompanying notes 10-52 with text acompanying notes 58-
137 supra. If a broker-dealer prepares and distributes investment newsletters,
there are slight differences between the NASD treatment and the Advisers Act
treatment of such letters. Compare note 27 supra with NASD MANUAL (CCH)
2151.01. Minor differences also exist in the situation where an investment adviser
acts in a broker or dealer capacity for an advisory client. Compare Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, § 11(d)(2), 15 U.S.C § 78k(d)(2) (1976) with Investment Advis-
ers Act of 1940, § 206(3) (1976). There are two respects in which the Advisers Act
is more stringent than the Securities Exchange Act. A broker-dealer registered
under the Exchange Act who effects a transaction for a client when acting as prin-
cipal for his own account or as a broker for someone other than the client (1) may
wait until the transaction takes place to disclose to the client the capacity in which
he is acting and, (2) need not obtain consent of the client to act in such capacity.
183. Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, § 11(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78k(a)(1)
(1976). These provisions did not take effect until May 1, 1978 for members of na-
tional securities exchanges who were members thereof on May 1, 1975. Id. §
11(a) (3), 15 U.S.C. § 78k(a) (3) (1976).
vent broker-dealers from managing individual accounts on a dis-
cretionary basis.184 If this were done, and if indirect fees on
nondiscretionary accounts were banned as well, reasons to distin-
guish between the advising activities of investment advisers and
broker-dealers would be virtually nonexistent.
3. Banks
Any contemplated revision of federal regulations governing
banks acting as providers of investment advice should initially
recognize that standards presently applicable to such banks are
by no means uniform. Unless a bank-adviser is a trust depart-
ment of a national bank (governed by Regulation 9) or a subsidi-
ary of a bank holding company (required to register as an
investment adviser under the Investment Advisers Act), it is not
subject to any specific federal laws or regulations. Comparable
standards ought to apply to a bank-adviser whether such adviser
is a national bank trust department, a subsidiary of a bank hold-
ing company, a state member bank, or a state nonmenber bank
insured by the FDIC.
Since subsidiaries of bank holding companies are subject only
to the Investment Advisers Act, they may be treated as invest-
ment advisers for purposes of discussing regulatory reform. This
means that the recommendations cited above 185 should be ap-
plied to these subsidiaries as well. On the other hand, if the Ad-
visers Act is amended in accordance with the SEC's proposals186
(requiring satisfaction of financial and qualifications standards) a
more persuasive case can be made to support the claim that addi-
tional protection for investment advisory clients of bank subsidi-
aries is unnecessary.
As for amending the regulations concerning national bank trust
departments, there does not appear to be a significant lack of in-
vestor protection. Such trust departments are subject to stand-
ards comparable to those applying to registered broker-dealers,
although, in most instances, the trust department standards are
not as well defined as those for registered broker-dealers. There
are a couple of exceptions, however; non-officer bank employees
are not required to satisfy qualifications standards187 and banks
are not subject to the "suitability" doctrine. These may be trivial
exceptions, though. It may be of little importance that ordinary
trust employees are not experts in investment advice so long as
184. Id. § 11(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78(a)(2) (1976).
185. See text accompanying notes 168-78 supra.
186. See SEC Proposals, supra note 1.
187. See text at note 148 supra.
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their superiors are. Similarly, banks are subject to a federal regu-
lation resembling the suitability doctrine,188 and may be held to a
comparable obligation pursuant to state law proscribing the be-
havior of "fiduciaries."18 9 National bank trust departments, like
registered broker-dealers, should also be bound by Section 205 of
the Advisers Act dealing with the contract between client and ad-
viser.19
This leaves for consideration the regulation of state member
banks and state nonmenber banks insured by the FDIC. Pursu-
ant to the above analysis, they should be brought within the aegis
of Regulation 9 and Advisers Act Section 205 (or equivalent provi-
sions), or they should be regulated in the same manner as recom-
mended for investment advisers, supra.
188. Yale Note, supra note 136, at 1501 n.156, 1502. This is a required review of
assets held in fiduciary accounts, conducted once every 15 months. See id.; 12
C.F.R. § 9.9 (1978). It appears that such review does not consider the peculiar cir-
cumstances of each account. This may be appropriate for personal estates and
trusts since the owners of these accounts are likely to comprise a fairly homogene-
ous group. On the other hand, this review (even if one is willing to agree that an
evaluation every 15 months is sufficient) would be an inappropriate substitute for
the suitability rule with regard to managing agency accounts. These accounts may
be established by an individual with assets of $10,000 or $10,000,000; the needs and
objectives of such persons are not likely to be compatible.
189. For example, a bank acting as trustee is under a state law duty "to make
such investment as a prudent man would make of his own property having prima-
rily in view the preservation of the estate and the amount and regularity of the
income to be derived". MI Scor ON TRUSTS § 227, at 1660 (2d ed. 1956). This duty,
however, does not appear to take into account the particular needs and objectives
of individual trust beneficiaries.
190. See text accompanying notes 15-20 supra.

